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ABSTRACT 
Since the military coup of 1992, Algeria has been involved in a conflict which has 
claimed the lives of at least 100 000 people. The conflict has generally been portrayed 
as one which has pitted Islamists against the secular Algerian government. However, 
a study of Algerian history illustrates a sustained and dominant role of the Algerian 
military. The dominance of the military was firmly entrenched in the 1965 coup led by 
Boumedienne. His successor Benjedid, an active- duty colonel, selected by a core 
military elite upon Boumedienne's sudden illness, continued the military dominance, 
although during both reigns a civilian facade was maintained. The coup of 1992 was 
organised by a select group of generals who continue to wield power in Algeria today. 
The behaviour of the military in Algeria, subsequent to the coup, was marked by 
assassinations, disappearances, torture and violent repression of those who opposed 
the military controlled state. This behaviour reflects the behaviour of the military 
during the war of liberation, and during independence. Of equal importance is that 
the present military elite has used covert organisations whose modus operandi 
mirrors French military conduct during the war of liberation. This includes the use of 
torture to instil fear among the Algerian population. Consequently, to understand the 
violence which has engulfed Algeria since 1992 is to understand the dominance of the 
military and military elite. These men continue to wield power through the only means 
they have been confronted with and encountered, force. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1992, after a military coup, Algeria has been involved in a conflict which has 
claimed the lives of thousands of Algerians. Even after the adoption of the concorde 
civile, an amnesty agreement, approximately 100 to 200 Algerians continue to die each 
month. 
This study examines the role of the military in Algerian political life and contends that 
the military has always been a major player in the political field with the result that 
disputes are settled with the sword rather than the pen. Through a study of Algerian 
history the importance of military might to solve problems is illuminated. 
The extensive bloodshed in Algeria since the cancelled election of late 1992 cannot 
merely be reduced to a question of the Islamic Salvation Front's ideology or any other 
more extreme ideology. Especially in the current discourse, particularly after the events 
of September 11, the Islamist threat has became the central topic of academic and 
political discussion with acts of violence and terror falling within the realm of Islamist 
behaviour. This does not mean that the Islamists are exempt from any responsibility for 
the state of violence in which Algeria finds itself, nonetheless an excessive emphasis on 
the Islamist threat prevents an examination of other parties who may be as responsible or 
even more so for the conflict. The persistence of a military presence in the political arena 
and its continued recourse to violence to quell opposition throughout Algerian history 
will be illustrated to help understand the violence which has engulfed Algeria. 
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1.1 Literature review 
There is extensive literature on Algeria, especially the war of liberation and most recently 
the current conflict. However, none of the writers focus specifically on the military's role 
in the development of Algeria. Although aspects of the military involvement are 
discussed, a historical development of the military does not form the primary basis of the 
studies. The following discusses a few of the dominant and current writings on Algeria 
since the coup of 1992. 
Luis Martinez has written a contentious account of the Algerian conflict. In his book, The 
Algerian Civil War 1990-1998, Martinez postulates the theory that the Algerian conflict 
is a method of accumulating wealth and prestige and as a result is constantly being 
readapted by the participants in the conflict. This theory is qualified by his assertion that 
the historical context for the development of a war culture must be taken into account in 
order to understand the process. He then proceeds to develop his theory by explaining 
that in Algerian history violence has been a respected means of social advancement and 
this has been particularly evident with the Corsairs under the Ottoman Empire, the Caid 
(native official) under colonial rule and Colonel (officer of the Armee de Liberation 
Nationale) during the war of liberation. The following chapters are an in-depth account 
of the development of the war economy in Algeria. Through interviews with various 
members of society from the petty trader to the wealthy elite the various nuances and 
intricacies of the war are shaped. The notion of the monolithic Islam and secularist 
regime battling it out is immediately eroded. Cruelty inflicted on individuals by the 
regime, perceptions of the Front de Liberation Nationale, Islam in all its forms, 
corruption, inter alia, are aspects which one becomes privy to through the interviews. 
Furthermore, the changing beliefs of individuals as the war progresses illustrate the 
metamorphic character of the war. Martinez illustrates how as the war develops the 
economically impoverished Algerian has either taken the path of joining the Islamists or 
the army for further social advancement. A social change is taking place, as those who 
were unable to gain access to wealth under the Front de Liberation Nationale are now 
able to accumulate wealth as armed Islamists. The military has also been able to 
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consolidate its wealth through financial packages received from the international 
community and multinational oil companies that have recently entered Algeria. 
Moreover, the military has been able to monopolise the import and export trade and its 
members are the few Algerians able to obtain visas. 
The development of individuals, groups, institutions and states in the economy of war is 
discussed in detail. Critique has been levelled at Martinez for neglecting to examine 
ideology in his study, and regarding material motivation as the only driving force in the 
civil war. Admittedly, these were my first thoughts on completion of the book since it 
appeared to be a sad indictment of Algerian society. However, Martinez does maintain 
that the protagonists of the civil war are the ones who thrive in the environment of 
violence. The war is now being waged by smaller armed guerrillas controlled by Emirs 
who have turned to illegal activity. Nonetheless, Martinez fails to consistently confine his 
central theory to these protagonists. Perhaps a more delineated appraisal of the situation 
should have been undertaken with a clear caveat that the war allows certain individuals, 
groups and institutions to prosper and that many Algerians may not be seeking wealth or 
prestige through violence. The pronouncement that the violence is limited to groups is not 
made often enough. This may be the down fall of the book, since the final assessment 
leaves the reader with a bitter taste since it would seem that accumulation of wealth and 
prestige is a driving force for Algerians. This point is dealt with more harshly by Hugh 
Roberts who maintains that "Martinez's wider argument seems to express a regression 
into orientalism of the worst kind, a regression which is not in itself implicit in the core of 
his analysis so much as plastered around it as a mystical shell."! 
Moreover, the role of the military is primarily dealt with in so far as it forms part of the 
war economy. The history of military involvement and suppression of opposition is not 
dealt with sufficiently. It would appear that a theory is postulated and then supported, 
rather than a factual depiction of the situation followed by a theoretical analysis. This 
ultimately results in the feeling that not all aspects ofthe story have been told. 
1. Hugh Roberts, Embattled Algeria 1988~2002: Studies in a Broken Polity, Verso, London, 2003, 256. 
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Martin Stone's work, The Agony of Algeria, is probably the most comprehensive work on 
the current conflict. It is a historical account predating the war of independence and 
discusses social, economic, domestic and international political aspects. The military 
forms part of this analysis from its inception to its current role. However, although 
mention is made of covert activities from information garnered from organisations such 
as Amnesty International, the extent and pattern of military violence and terror is not 
expounded upon fully. Understandably to delve thoroughly into the intricacies of the 
military's use of terror would detract from the more general overall picture Stone 
achieves in painting. The book does however provide a basis for understanding military 
participation in the war. 
Michael Willis' book entitled Islamist Challenge in Algeria, as the title suggests, focuses 
predominately on the rise of Islamism in Algeria and the Islamist role in the current 
conflict. Although once again the covert tactics of the military are mentioned, they form a 
minor part of the discussion and these activities are not really placed in an historical 
context of military behaviour. Nonetheless, Willis' book provides an understanding, 
because of his historical study of the deVelopment of Islamists as a political force, of the 
movement's ideology, support base, external influences and the responses to the 
movement by both the colonial government and independent Algerian government. He 
concludes with the salient point that Islamist movements have not been sparked by 
religious fervour, but rather by the social, political and economic hardships that Algerians 
faced in the late 1970s and continue to face today. 
The most recent account of the current conflict is provided by Hugh Roberts in his book 
entitled Embattled Algeria 1988-2002: Studies in a Broken Polity. The book is basically a 
collection of essays relating to the crisis from 1988 to 2002. Roberts is a specialist in 
Algeria and this becomes abundantly clear with the insight he brings into the study of the 
conflict. As a result of his knowledge on the subject he is able to provide in depth 
analyses of the issues involved in the conflict. The book is however a collection and as 
such the flow of the work is interrupted. The military once again does not form the 
primary analysis, but weaved into some of the essays is the role the military plays in 
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Algerian political life. The primacy of the military since the war of liberation is a theme 
in the context of his discussions. A detailed documentation of this process is not 
provided, and although the covert practises of the military is discussed, this is only really 
done in passing. Since this book is in essay format the reader is able to gain an 
understanding of identity issues, the Islamist movement, the political landscape in terms 
of parties involved, elections and democratisation. It therefore also shows the complexity 
ofthe Algerian conflict. Nonetheless, although acknowledging the primacy of the 
military, the military's involvement in the conflict and its covert activities in attempts to 
eliminate the Islamist threat are not discussed independently. No single essay deals 
explicitly with the military. 
Most accounts of the military in Algeria can be found in journal articles by authors such 
as Zartman and Joffe. Even though these articles focus on the dominant role ofthe 
military, they do not focus on the military in terms of the violence and terror which has 
engulfed Algerian society. The only reports which focus on the violence are those reports 
by organisations, such as, Amnesty International, Algeria Watch, and Human Rights 
Watch. 
This work examines the role of the military in Algerian history and incorporates the 
accounts of violence and terror from the abovementioned organisations. It seeks to create 
a systematic and coherent understanding of the violence which has enveloped Algeria by 
placing these accounts in context and with reference to previous accounts of violence and 
terror in Algerian history perpetrated by the military. 
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1.2 Methodology 
The methodology adopted is a historical descriptive case study. The justification for 
adopting this method is that, as discussed in the literature review, insufficient focus has 
been paid to the military's role in the conflict. Although, most writers admit that the 
military has been instrumental in the conflict, no thorough study of the military has been 
taken independently and none specifically in relation to the violence which has ensued. 
A historical descriptive case study can help illustrate a pattern of specific features which 
could subsequently be used as a factual source base for further theoretical and conceptual 
studies.2 Moreover, especially within an African context, a historical study is imperative, 
since any explanation of an African military cannot be undertaken without understanding 
the colonial impact on the country and the process of decolonisation. The origins and 
traditions of present day armed forces in most of ex-colonial Africa may be traced to 
colonial rule in Africa. Therefore an understanding of the military today requires an 
understanding of its roots and the forces which shaped its development.3 This is 
particularly relevant in the Algerian context. The French military during colonial 
occupation virtually ran the colonial state and impacted society deeply. The Algerian 
military after independence came to display very similar characteristics to its colonial 
predecessor. 
It has been suggested that the best analysis of the military is to integrate the internal 
characteristics of the military approach with the social and political circumstances in 
which armed forces operate. The former approach is mainly restricted to the internal 
characteristics and interaction of the armed forces, and has as its main proponent 
Janowitz, and the latter, focusing on the socio-political environment is generally 
associated with Huntington and Finer.4 Indeed, focusing on the socio-political 
environment is crucial, especially when discussing Africa which endured colonial 
2. Ibid. xv. 
3. A. Omara-Otunna, Politics and the Military in Uganda, London, Macmillan Press, 1987. 
4. S. Baynham, Military Power and Politics in Black Africa, Kent, Croom Helm Ltd, 1986. 
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imposition and which subsequently had to pick up the pieces after colonial rule. It also 
enables an examination of regional and international factors on the military. 
Thus, while a historical descriptive analysis will be rendered, special emphasis will be 
placed on the social and political circumstances that shaped the development of the 
military and the military elite and where possible the internal characteristics of the 
military will be provided in order to render a comprehensive study. 
The adoption of a case study approach has obvious benefits. A case study permits a more 
in depth study of the military and accommodates complexities which may arise. Since a 
study focusing on the military appears lacking, a descriptive case study will help establish 
factual accounts. 
Finally, the use of sources such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch may 
be contentious because organisations such as these may use emotive language to alert a 
wider audience to existing conflicts. Wherever information from these sources has been 
used, I have attempted to substantiate the claims using other sources. Admittedly, it is 
these organisations that often come into daily contact with the victims of violence and 
often present the most information regarding violent conflict. Therefore, as a source, 
organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch provide valuable 
information on cases of conflict. 
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1.3 Concepts 
The following are a few concepts used in the telling of this tale. The motivation for this is 
that some concepts are quite contentious and it is therefore appropriate to provide a 
definition of the concept to create clarity in the work which follows. 
1.3.1 Conflict 
The term conflict will be used to describe the situation currently existing in Algeria. The 
reason for this is to avoid the ideological connotations that will readily be imputed when 
using terms such as, civil war or holy war, since Algeria is a predominately Muslim 
country. A conflict arises when there are more than 1 000 causalities per year. 
1.3.2 Islarnists 
The word Islamists in this context denotes the persons involved in political Islam. 
Political Islam is a term established by Joel Beinin and Joe Stork and refers to a 
movement whose concerns can be regarded as temporal and political. The Quran and 
Hadiths (sayings and behaviours of the prophet Muhammad) are used by Islamists to 
justify their actions and pronouncements on certain issues. These Islamists use these 
religious texts and combine them with ideas and techniques of the present to cope with 
political, social, economic and cultural predicaments of the modem world. These 
predicaments often have their roots in the expansion of a capitalist market, colonisation 
by the French and English, the failures of economic and political development and the 
hybridisation of culture and identity often as a consequence of colonialism. 5 
1.3.3 Military elite 
The term military elite refers to a small group, usually generals, who wield principal 
power in Algeria. 
5. J. Beinin, and J. Stork, On the Modernity, Historical Specificity, and International Context of Political Islam, In Political 
Islam, Joel Benin and Joe Stork, Eds, Los Angeles, University of Cali fomi a Press, 1997,3-4. 
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1.4 Chapter Outlines 
This work is comprised of two chapters. The first chapter provides a history of Algeria 
preceding the conflict. As with the second chapter, this chapter is divided into sections in 
order to illustrate the historical process. The first section provides a brief history of 
Algeria from the onset of colonialism to the formation of the Armee de Liberation 
Nationale. Thereafter, in order to understand subsequent uses of violence and terror in 
Algeria, short accounts of the practices and behaviour of both the Armee de Liberation 
Nationale and French army are provided. Finally, a discussion on the reigns of Ben Bella, 
Boumedienne and Benjedid, their use of force to eliminate opposition and the 
establishment of a military elite, concludes this chapter. The second chapter examines the 
conflict which followed the coup of 1992.This chapter is similarly divided into sections. 
The first focuses on the participants of the conflict in general. The second o~ the Algerian 
military specifically and the third examines the military's behaviour during the conflict. 
Lastly, the fourth section discusses the role of the international community since the 1992 
coup. Finally, this work concludes with a summary of the salient issues drawn from the 
case study. 
9 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
2. THE YEARS PRECEDING THE CONFLICT 
2.1 Introduction 
As discussed previously in the methodology, an analysis of current day events in Africa 
cannot be undertaken without reference to colonialism and the anti-colonial struggle. 
Especially in a country such as Algeria where colonialism was undertaken through force 
and predominately by a military force, an examination of colonialism and the fight 
against it becomes imperative. Furthermore, since this work argues that the violence since 
the coup of 1992 can only be understood in terms of the dominance of the military in 
political1ife, a historical pattern of military involvement, both Algerian and French, 
provides a foundation for understanding who the participants are and their behaviour 
during the conflict. 
2.2 Colonial Conquest 
In order to dominate it, modify it, and plunder it for the profit of a new people you will 
always have to be the stronger, either through a permanent army or by the nature and 
constitution of a dominating people. 
Bugeaud addressing the members of the National 
Assembll 
6. E. Hermassi, Leaderships and National Development in North Africa, London, University of Cali fomi a Press Ltd, 1972,60. 
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2.2.1 Introduction 
The following is a brief history of the colonial conquest of Algeria and the fonnation of 
political groups followed by anned resistance to end colonial rule. 
2.2.2 Colonialism 
Algeria was colonised by the French in 1830. Initially the French practised a fonn of 
limited occupation which meant that they would occupy the main towns of the Algerian 
coast while only exercising authority over the remainder of the country via native or 
Turkish rulers. However, the policy of limited occupation could not be sustained, 
primarily owing to the implacable hostility of Algerian Muslims to Christian rule and 
also because of the uncontrollable ambitions of the then small, though vocal, European 
colonist or colon. Consequently, in 1834 the occupied territories were annexed as a 
colony of France. A governor-general was created for the territory and in 1839 the 
country was officially named Algeria. Yet, unlike the easy colonisation of the Algerian 
littoral, French incursion into the interior was met with fierce native resistance which was 
sustained for nearly two decades. The most formidable resistance leader was Abdel 
Kader who through consensus, coercion and conquest was able to unite the many warring 
groups under his command. Abdel Kader was a young marabout who at the tender age of 
twenty-four was acclaimed by some of the tribes in the Mascara region as 'Sultan of the 
Arabs'. A devout and courageous young leader, he declared his first task a holy war 
against the infidels.7 
Despite Abdel Kader's valiant resistance, the French prevailed. The expansionist-minded 
French military and bureaucrats would not be prevented from their colonial ambitions 
and decided on a policy of total war. This involved the destruction of villages, the 
burning of crops, the killing of herds and other methods aimed at debilitating the 
resistance. In 1840 General Bugeaud was appointed governor. Once the military took 
control of the colonial process, its own momentum carried it forward. The fight against 
7. C-R Ageron, Modern Algeria: a Historyfrom 1830 to the Present, New Jersey, Africa World Press, Inc, 1991, 12. 
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Abdel Kader continued until his surrender in December 1847.8 Pacification of Algerians 
took another quarter of a century, with local insurrections continuing especially in 
Amazigh9 country and with the process only really coming to an end in the 1880s. 
Algeria therefore endured almost half a century of continual warfare. 1O 
2.2.3 Algerian Nationalists 
Under the Second Republic, France consisted mainly of peasants and soldiers with a very 
small middle class. Since a well-organised middle class was practically non-existent, the 
French officers were left to decide the fate of the native population in Algeria. They 
believed that the only way to further colonialism was to exterminate the native population 
in much the same way the Europeans had done in America. If extermination was too 
arduous, the best way to achieve their objective would be to push them into the 
mountains and deserts and repopulate the plains with French peasants. Initially Algeria 
failed to attract enough settlers since the rapid urbanisation in France absorbed most of 
the rural peasants. For this reason Napoleon III abandoned the policy of settler 
colonisation in 1860 and also averred, causing great consternation among the colons, 
"Algeria is not, strictly speaking, a colony but an Arab Kingdom".ll However, France in 
1871, now under the Third Republic, returned to the policy of colonisation by settlement, 
and this time for good. The process was greatly assisted by the huge immigration of 
Alsatians and Lorrainers. 12 
By 1871 the French had also adopted the policy of assimilation. This process would be 
gradual and only apply once the Algerians had become 'true Frenchmen' in the cultural 
sense. The ideology at the time could not fathom or conceive of a civilisation other that 
that of the European civilisation. However, there was a fatal flaw in this policy. Besides 
the naive supposition that it was possible to de-arabise Algeria, the scheme was further 
8. S. Amin, Tlte Maghreb in Ihe Modern World. London, Penguin Books Ltd, 1970,96. 
9. Amazigh is the name the Berbers prefer to be called. The word Berber means foreigner, which the Amazigh people are not. 
10. S. Amin, op. cit., 96. 
11. CoR. Ageron, op. cit., 38. 
12. s. Amin, op. cit., 97. 
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undermined by the growing number of colons who were vehemently opposed to the 
system of assimilation. The colons were granted all the rights afforded those citizens 
living in a European democracy, while Muslims remained subject to the government of 
the 'Ministry of Native Affairs,.l3 
In reality, the system of assimilation was merely a facade for the destruction of the 
Algerian people. The effects of the process of assimilation is most aptly described by 
Hermassi, 
On the pretext of the need for assimilation, France devoted nearly a century 
and a half to the erasing of all existent signs of Algerian sovereignty. 
Nationality, culture and local traditions were ultimately negated in the name 
of an ideology of integration. Not only did this policy destroy the state and 
force most of the urban bourgeois families to emigrate to the Middle East but 
it also took from the rural population its sense of identity and sentenced all 
Algerians to be pariahs in a caste society. In reality, integration meant that 
Algerians were sacrificed for and left out of the French-administered 
economIC system; the tragic result was that Algerians had no control 
whatsoever over the sweeping socio-economic transformations of their own 
country. 14 
From the period 1870 to 1920 Algeria went through what was probably the most sombre 
period of history it had thus far experienced. The defeated peasantry was SUbjected to a 
new bureaucratic form of feudalism. This was a time when the peasantry was afflicted by 
the mortal wounds of settler extension and reduction of land leading to famine. Confmed 
to the mountainous regions, nationalism took root firstly among those most affected by 
the French colonial onslaught. I5 
13. Ibid. 
14. E. Hennassi, op. cit., 70. 
15. S. Amin, op. cit.. 107. 
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The first signs of urban resistance appeared in the early years of the nineteenth century in 
the form of a small Muslim secularised elite. They sought equality with the French of 
Algeria and therefore urged the policy of assimilation. This would mean the end of fiscal 
inequality, the extension of primary education, an increase in political representation of 
the Muslim population and the abolition of the indigenat system. 16 However, soon more 
radical groups developed as a result of French suppression of the more moderate groups 
and French ruthless massacres such as the Setif massacre of 1945 which resulted in the 
deaths of over 45000 Algerians. I7 
The succeeding years found Algerian national aspirations given form in multiple and 
often antagonistic organisations. Three orientations can be distinguished. The first was 
the reconciliatory expression found in the aspirations of the intellectuals and liberal 
bourgeoisie, most definitively symbolised by Ferhat Abbas. The second orientation was 
conceived in the labour milieu of Paris, under Messali and transplanted to Algeria in 
1937 under the name of the Parti du Peuple Algerien and in its final form the Mouvement 
Nationaliste Algerien (MNA). Finally, the traditional literate bourgeoisie along with the 
Algerian Ulama (AUMA) who focused on the defence of cultural identity and made 
popular the slogan developed by Ben Badis, "Islam is our religion, Arabic our language 
and Algeria our country.,,18 
Despite numerous attempts at unification, these three orientations never succeeded in 
formulating a single coherent leadership. One hypothesis regarding the general dissensus 
among the Algerian elite is the complete destruction of their political state by a total 
colonial state.19 The launching of the armed struggle was an attempt to transcend the 
divisions permeating the political elite which had effectively resulted in political 
impotence. The men who authored the initiative had previously attempted to establish a 
paramilitary organisation, Organisation Speciale (OS), which was short lived, since it 
was soon discovered and dismantled. The underground leaders of the OS included Ben 
16. Native penal system that provides the French administrators with extensive and excessive powers. 
17. C·R. Ageron, op. cit., 102. 
18. E. Hermassi, op. cit., 131. 
19. Ibid. 132. 
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Bella, Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Boudiaf and Abdelhafid Boussouf. A new organisation 
known as the Comite Revolutionaire d'Unite et d'Action (eRUA) and then as the Front de 
Liberation Nationale (FLN) would not fail and called for unity of action by everyone, 
without judgement of past differences.2o The most prominent members of the FLN were 
Rabah Bitat, Mostefa Ben Boulaid, Mourad Didouche, Mohamed Boudiaf, Belkarem 
Krim, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Ahmed Ben Bella, Mohamed Khider and Hocine Ait Ahmed.21 
These men were known as the Neuf Historiques - the Historic Nine. The armed wing of 
the FLN was the Armee de Liberation Nationale. 
Nonetheless, the pretext of unity achieved during the fight for liberation was always that, 
merely a pretext. Already in 1936 Ferhat Abbas declared: 
Had I discovered the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and I would 
not blush as if I had committed a crime .... However, I will not die for the 
Algerian nation, because it does not exist. I have not found it. I have 
examined History, I questioned the living and the dead, I visited cemeteries; 
nobody spoke to me about it. I then turned to the Koran and I sought for one 
solitary verse forbidding a Muslim from integrating himself with a non-
Muslim nation. I did not fmd that either. One cannot build on the wind.22 
2.2.4 Conclusion 
The French military was instrumental in co Ionising Algeria because of continued 
resistance from Algerians. Only through destruction of land, homes and cattle was total 
conquest achieved. Political resistance to colonialism failed to achieve any significant 
change, primarily owing to the competing ideologies of the groups. The armed resistance 
which eventually emerged tried to unify cleavages existing among these groups. 
20. Ibid. 135. 
21. P. Paul-Marie, L'independance au bout du fusil, In Jeune Afrique L'intelligent, Series number 4, 2002, 25. 
22. E. Hermassi, op. cit., 33. 
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However, the unity achieved was merely a facade and allegiances and rivalries continued 
to mark Algerian society. 
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2.3 The Anti-Colonial Struggle 
We rebel for life and death, 
and we promised to vivifY Algeria: 
be witnesses of it! 
We are rebel soldiers, and we fight 
for right and independence; 
because France does not listen to our voices ... 
Hymn of the Underground23 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The previous section provided a brief description of colonialism in Algeria and the 
formation of the armed resistance, the FLN, and its military wing the Armee de 
Liberation Nationale (ALN). This section discusses the roles of the ALN and the French 
army in the war of liberation. The animosity between groups within the ALN, the 
eradication of those the FLN leaders considered a threat, and the methods of torture used 
by the French army as well as its political agenda are issues which become manifest in 
independent Algeria and the subsequent conflict. Therefore, an understanding of the 
ALN and the French army provides a foundation for understanding subsequent events. 
2.3.1.1 The Armee de Liberation Nationale 
The ALN was the backbone of the Algerian Revolution and without it no political effort 
would have been meaningful. During the early months of rebellion the army was no more 
than a band of men operating on their own and raiding the French army for guns and 
ammunition. However, in 1956 at the Soummam Valley Conference members of the FLN 
concluded that, 
23. P.e. Naylor, France and Algeria: A History of Deco Ion isation and'Transformation, Gainsville, University Press of Florida. 
2000,23. 
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It is an undeniable fact that the action of the ALN has reversed the political 
climate of Algeria. 
n has provoked a psychological shock which has liberated the people from a 
torpor, from its fear, from its scepticism. 
It has permitted the Algerian people a new consciousness of its national 
dignity. 
It has brought about as well a psycho-political unity of all Algerians, a 
national unanimity which fertilises the armed struggle and renders the 
victory ineluctable,z4 
At the conference it was decided that Algeria would be divided into six wilayas (military 
districts) which were based mainly on old political divisions?5 To the original five 
wilayas, a further wilaya ofthe Sahara was added. The city of Algiers was regarded as an 
autonomous zone. Each wilaya was divided into regions, and each region into sectors. 
The wilaya commander held the rank of colonel, the highest rank the army would use 
during the war. Each military unit consisted of a group of eleven men; the section of 
thirty-five men; the company of one hundred and ten men; and the battalion of three 
hundred and fifty men. There were three types of army volunteers: the moudjahidines 
(freedom fighters or combatants of the faith), the moussebelines (auxiliaries) and the 
fidayines (city fighters). In certain areas large commandos of death also known as 
moussebelines were established. They operated independently of local command and 
undertook particularly dangerous tasks. 26 At the early stages of the revolution a new 
recruit was required to undergo an initiation ritual. The initiation involved killing a 
designated traitor, Mouchard-police spy or informer, French gendarme officer or 
colonialist, whilst in the company of a shadow who would kill the aspiring recruit himself 
ifhe saw any sign of hesitation. Krim, the leader of the interior military, admitted this 
policy in an interview in a Yugoslav journal, in which he stated that, "An assassination 
24. J. Gillespie, Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution, London, Ernest Benn Limited, 1960, 132·133. 
25. Ibid. 107. 
26. Ibid. 108. 
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marks the end of the apprenticeship of each candidate for the A.L.N." This passing out 
ceremony marked the acceptance of the apprentice into the ranks as he proved himself 
reliable and became bound almost Faust-like to the cause.27 
As the war progressed so too did the Algerian army from a revolutionary army to a 
regular army. Initially all newcomers had been accepted, but as the ranks swelled, the 
army became more discerning. Preference was given to those who possessed former 
military training and training became more extensive within the marquis. In the camps in 
Tunisia and Morocco extensive courses were provided for both officers and men. Some 
of these men were sent as far as Egypt for commando courses and others to East 
Germany for engineering studies. As a result of the regulation of the army, discipline 
became more regularised with the establishment of disciplinary codes and often harsh 
sentences meted out for any breaches of the code. 28 
During 1956 and 1957, the internal ALN successfully applied hit and run tactics, classic 
canons of guerrilla warfare. The fighters specialised in night raids, ambushes and avoided 
any direct contact with superior French flrepower. Once they had completed their tasks 
they would merge back within the popUlation of the countryside.29 The key wilayas 
throughout the war were the Aures and Kabyle. These areas were predominately 
populated by Amazigh speakers from which the flghters drew much of their support.30 
The ALN independence flghters were inspired by writings from classic texts on guerrilla 
warfare. As such they borrowed most techniques from Mao, Viet Minh and Yugoslav 
partisans. These techniques were then applied creatively to the altered Algerian 
condi tions. 31 
27. A. Home, A Savage War oj Peace, London, Macmillan London Ltd, 1977,34. 
28. J. Gillespie, op. cit, 108-109. 
29. Library of Congress, Algeria: Conduct oJthe War, [Online], Available: http://lcweb2.1oc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frdlcstdy:@field (DOCID+dz0039), [4 September 2002], 1993, l. 
30. K.W. Grundy, Guerrilla Struggle inAJrica, New York, Grossman Publishers, 1971,84. 
31. Ibid. 90. 
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Although writers at the time, such as Fanon and Gillespie, viewed the war of liberation 
with admiration, there were also problems. Tensions were always running high within the 
political and military elite. Some of the wilaya commanders died under mysterious 
circumstances, probably victims of jealous rivalries.32 Moreover, there are numerous 
accounts of honour killings. Anthropologists have noted that honour remains a constant 
preoccupation of Mediterranean societies. People in the Mediterranean are often called 
upon to use the concepts of honour and shame in order that their own conduct and that of 
members within the society can be assessed.33 Honour and shame permeates the lives of 
individuals in exclusive societies where face to face personal interaction dominates and 
relations between individuals are of utmost importance. This is exemplified in Professor 
Bourdieu's analysis of honour in Kabyle society where values of honour constitute the 
basis of the Kabyle political order.34 Consequently, reference is often made of honour 
killings in the war and in the subsequent conflict following the 1992 coup which will be 
discussed later. 
Besides rivalries and honour killings, politically motivated assassinations of members of 
the liberation movement were also evident. Ramdane Abane, a staunch Algerian 
nationalist and firm believer in a military struggle suffered this fate. It is believed that a 
jury constituted of high-ranking FLN officials headed by Krim Belkacem and Cherif 
Mahmoud decided that Abane was becoming a threat to the revolutionary cause. 
Although there is rumour of a document officialising the assassination none has been 
found, and there still remains a cloud of mystery shrouding his death. The reasons for the 
assassination are unknown. There is speCUlation that Abane was becoming too powerful 
and threatened the power of the established FLN leadership. Others maintain that his 
harsh treatment of those who committed war crimes and his dictatorial impulses may 
have been reasons for his death. Abane was strangled at a farmhouse near Tetouan and 
his body has never been found. 35 The ALN was also used to eradicate opposition groups 
32. D. and M. Ottaway, Algeria. The Politics 0/ a Socialist Revolution, California, University of California Press, 1970, IS. 
33. J.O. Peristiany, Honour and Shame: The Values a/Mediterranean Society, Chicago, University of Chic ago Press, 1966, 10. 
34. Ibid. 16. 
35. World Amazigh Action Coalition. Historical Figures: Algeria. [Online], Available: 
http://www.waac.orgiamazighlhistory/personalities/algerialkrim_beJkacem.html, [5 August 2002],1998. 
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or those the leaders believed deviated from the principles of the FLN such as the Algerian 
Communist Party and Messali' s M.N.A. In a proclamation issued by the FLN and drafted 
by none other than Abane, dated April 1, 1955, the FLN declared, 
The tribunal of the A.L.N [Armee de Liberation Nationale, as the military 
arm of the F.L.N. has now become known] will be pitiless towards traitors 
and enemies of the country ... 36 
This the ALN was without hesitation. The army received orders, often from Ben Bella, 
such as "Liquidate all personalities who want to play the role of interlocuteur valable" 
and "Kill any person attempting to deflect the militants and inculcate in them a 
b 'b' .. ,,37 ourgtll zen spmt . 
2.3.1.2 Boumedienne and the External Army 
More than 30000 men were deployed along conventional lines as an external army in 
Moroccan and Tunisian sanctuaries near the Algerian border. Here they served mainly to 
divert French manpower from the main theatres of guerrilla activity. The external army 
was, however, effectively cut off from the theatre of battle by formidable defence lines of 
electrified barbed wire and minefields built by the French in 1957 all along Algeria's 
borders with Morocco and Tunisia. This line was known as the Morice Line. Therefore, 
despite the external army's attempts at diversion, the brunt of the fighting was borne by 
the internals in the wi/ayas38 and as a result they suffered heavy losses. At the end of the 
war these men only commanded small forces, some estimate only 6 000 in the entire 
country. They regarded with disdain the external army who spent most of the war in 
Tunisia and Morocco. 39 
36. A. Horne, A Savage War of Peace, op. cit., 133. 
37. Ibid. 135. 
38. Library of Congress, op. cit. 
39. D. and M. Ottaway, op.cit., 15. 
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In 1960 Boumedienne, the future leader of the 1965 coup, became chief of staff of the 
external army and consolidated his power within it. The 1 200 men in Tunisia under the 
control of Mohamedi Said had degenerated into anarchy. Within this chaos young 
soldiers had taken to mugging and harassing locals. One of Boumedienne's first acts was 
to have twenty of these men shot dead in front of the troops. Trouble on the Moroccan 
border where Captain Zoubir led an insurrection was also effectively crushed. To prevent 
further indiscipline Boumedienne introduced tough deputies of his own.40 Thus, through 
instilling fear and discipline Boumedienne brought the external army firmly under his 
control. 
2.3.1.3 Conclusion 
From the events discussed above it is clear that grievances and rivalries were always 
present within the ALN. The grievances were not limited to hostility between the external 
and internal army, but were also evident among wi/aya commanders and commanders of 
the external army. Moreover, assassinations and eradication of opposition by the ALN 
were methods utilised by the FLN to maintain its control over the war of liberation. These 
techniques would be employed after independence and again in the current conflict. 
2.3.2.1 The French Army 
We want to halt the decadence of the West and the March of Communism. That is our 
duty, the real duty of the army. That is why we must win the war in Algeria. Indo-China 
taught us to see the tmth. 
Colonel Antoine Argoud, November 196041 
An analysis of the Algerian military is incomplete without understanding the beliefs and 
behaviour of the French army during the war ofliberation. Its commitment to keeping 
40. A. Home, A Savage War o/Peace, op. cit., 412. 
41. A. Home, A Savage War 0/ Peace, op. cit., 165. 
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Algeria French, its use oftorture and eventual coup attempt, are manifested in altered 
contexts and reframed ideologies in subsequent Algerian history. 
Possibly the most important reason for the desperate attempts to hold onto Algeria while 
the rest of Africa gained its independence was the fact that in 1848 the fateful step was 
taken to declare Algeria an integral part of France. Central to this was the fact that the 
French army was to make a promise of fidelity to Algeria Francaise in large part owing 
to its defeat in Southeast Asia.42 
Many soldiers came down with la mal jaune - army parlance for the spell Vietnam had 
cast over them. The women and landscape of Vietnam won the hearts and minds of the 
soldiers, and they swore they would never leave. The soldiers had lost touch with their 
own homeland. They felt estranged from France and its people. The French Communist 
Party's opposition to the war further deepened this sense of estrangement. The army had 
been in Vietnam since 1945, but it was the spring of 1954 with the siege of Dien Bien 
Phu, which determined the victors of the war. Within eight weeks the French 
capitulated.43 The army believed that conniving politicians, disinterested civilians and a 
traitorous Communist Party had aided its downfall. As the French set sail for France, 
Vietnamese they had promised never to abandon lined the shore, viewing them with 
contempt and hurt. Some swam to the departing ships, begging to be taken along. Those 
who watched swore they would never allow anything like this to happen again.44 It was 
these soldiers who were sent to Algeria and who took with them their resentment, their 
feeling of estrangement and lessons learnt in ill-fated Southeast Asia.45 
The French army's failure in Indo-China necessitated a victory in Algeria. Although its 
victory in 1957 in The Battle of Algiers signalled a military defeat for the FLN, it could 
probably not have been won without resort to institutionalised torture. Moreover, the 
belief that the French government was mistaken in relinquishing Algeria and the resultant 
42. A. Horne, The French Army in Politics. 1870-1970, London, Macmillan London Ltd, 1984,67-92. 
43. J. Talbot, The War Without a Name: France in Algeria 1954-1962, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1980,6. 
44. Ibid. 7. 
45. Ibid. 10. 
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failed coup in April 1961, displayed the first visible signs in Algeria that a military is 
prepared to act contrary to civilian government commands. What was clear in the case of 
the French Army on Algerian soil was its assessment of the legitimacy of the regime it 
served.46 It was determined not to relinquish Algeria Francaise. 
2.3.2.2 Torture 
An analysis of the use of torture both before and after independence is instructive because 
it has its source at the hands of the French during the war of independence and is 
reframed in the hands of the Algerian military elite in the context of the current conflict. 
Although the use of torture only became pronounced during the Battle of Algiers, when 
the FLN began to bomb areas in the city, both Ben Khedda and Francois Mitterand 
confirmed the use of torture before 1956. A letter written by a soldier, long before the 
Battle of Algiers, recounts his experience of the torture of two Arabs by gendarmes and 
evidences the use of torture before 1956. 
The first of the tortures consisted of suspending the two men completely 
naked by their feet, their hands bound behind their backs, and plunging their 
heads for a long time into a bucket of water to make them talk. The second 
torture consisted of suspending them, their hands and feet tied behind their 
backs, this time with their head upwards. Underneath them was placed a 
trestle, and they were made to swing, by fist blows, in such a fashion that 
their sexual parts rubbed against the very sharp pointed bar of the trestle. 
The only comment made by the men, turning towards the soldiers present: "I 
am ashamed to fmd myself stark naked in front of yoU:.47 
Although attempts were made to cover up the extent of the torture especially during the 
Battle of Algiers, reports of torture were numerous. In Vidal-Naquet's famous book on 
46. A. Horne, The French Army in Politics, 1870-1970, op. cit., 78. 
47. Ibid. 203. 
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terrorism in Algeria, he cites the killing by suffocation in March 1957 of forty-one out of 
one hundred and one detainees locked in wine cellars in Oran.48 The methods of torture 
were brutal and varied. Often electrodes were placed on areas of the body most notably 
the penis and the victim repeatedly shocked. There were also forms of water torture. 
Heads were repeatedly thrust into water troughs or the body filled with water through the 
mouth with the nose blocked. Finally, the tortures that degraded the victims such as 
thrusting bottles into the vaginas of young women, high pressure hoses inserted into the 
rectum.49 It is estimated that between thirty and forty percent of the entire male 
population of the Casbah was arrested and tortured during the Battle of Algiers.5o This 
form of institutionalised torture would rear its ugly head once again during the conflict 
which has plagued the country since 1992. 
2.3.2.3 Conclusion 
The use of terror by the French army during the war of liberation and its successful use 
could have disposed the Algerian military to its effectiveness as a means of fighting 
opposition. Moreover, as will be illustrated, the forms of terror used during the civil war 
mirrors those used by the French. The resilience displayed by the French army during the 
war and its continued fighting once the French government had capitulated illustrated the 
self-defined political aspirations the French military had adopted. Its contempt of what it 
perceived as its treacherous government was a sign that the French military would act 
contrary to the wishes of its leaders. This same belief that the military would act against a 
civilian government is reflected in the Algerian army in subsequent events. 
48. Ibid. 203-206. 
49. Ibid. 200. 
50. Ibid. 199. 
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2.4 Independent Algeria 
2.5 Introduction 
This section discusses the reigns of Ben Bella, Boumedienne and Benjedid. It illustrates 
the continued use of violence to eradicate opposition and the dominant role the military 
elite begins to play. 
2.5.1 Independence Achieved 
The war raged for nearly eight years and independence for Algeria was fmally achieved 
in 1962, not through military defeat ofthe French, but through a myriad of factors. 
External political pressure from the external FLN and the international community; 
guerrilla warfare inside and the external army; political internal resistance and resistance 
from some French groups at horne, all played their part in finally ensuring independence 
for Algeria. Moreover, the fact remains that a war waged against Arab nationalism in the 
age of decolonisation was an ill-fated war. Ageron in his book Modern Algeria writes 
that beyond the usual reasons afforded for finally deciding to relinquish Algeria, the 
French needed to understand that although Algeria had been conquered, the Muslims of 
Algeria never gave up the struggle. Although they had been vanquished they would never 
give in. The Algerians throughout the occupation repeated what the tribe of the Hachern 
had said to the French in 1841: 
This land is the land of the Arabs. You are no more than passing guests. 
Even if you stay here for three hundred years like the Turks, you will still 
have to leave!51 
51. C-R. Ageron, op. cit., 128. 
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2.5.2 Internal fighting 
At independence the rivalries which existed during the war between various political and 
military groups became more pronounced as various factions vied for power. Fighting 
broke out near Constantine between the political commissary Major Si Larbi, and 
commander-in-chief, Colonel Saout el-Arab of Wilaya Two (Constantine). Si Larbi acted 
primarily out of personal ambition, but since both were siding with different factions, the 
fighting assumed national significance. The actions of these men brought wilaya forces 
into conflict. The commanders of Wilaya Five (Oran), Wi/aya One (Aures Mountains) 
and Wilaya Six (Sahara) supported the external leadership. This was not fortuitous. 
During the war these wilayas had been well supplied by the external army, since they 
were closest to the frontiers. The wilayas of Wilaya Three (Kabylia) and Wilaya Four 
(Algiers) were isolated and their commanders embittered by the shortage of arms and 
provisions which should have come from outside. Nonetheless, some wilaya leaders were 
acting to maintain the fiefdoms they had procured during the war and which they wished 
to maintain after independence.52 
Many of the wilaya commanders also believed their authority and power would be 
depleted especially once conversion took place. The principle of conversion entailed 
some military men resuming civilian life while others would form part of the national 
army. Some commanders refused to accept the conversion in its entirety and issued the 
following statement, 
To consider the ALN an army that must go back to the barracks is to forget 
the real sense of the struggle that it has carried on alongside the people. To 
attack the problem of conversion from the top, that is to dissolve the wilaya 
commands, means to push aside the militants, thus leaving the door open to 
opportunists and those who collaborated with the colonial regime. The 
52. D. and M. Ottaway, op. cit., 21. 
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wilaya commands will remain in power until the formation of an Algerian 
government legally approved by the people. 53 
Fighting once again erupted and on a large scale. The Algerian people were shocked and 
appalled. In the year of independence on September 1, a crowd of about twenty thousand 
people stormed the Palais d'Ete, the French General's former summer residence, 
shouting "Baraket es-Senin!" "Seven years of war are enough!" In the country around 
Aumale, Boghari and Tairet, peasants flung themselves in the line of fire in order to stop 
the fighting which had engulfed them for years, crying "Baraket Dirigeants!" - "Enough, 
Leaders!" However, it was the troops of the external army, led by Boumedienne that 
ended the fighting. This was sadly achieved at the expense of several hundred ALN 
soldiers who had fought for the liberation of their country. In the fight for control, these 
men died at the hands of their own brothers. Boumedienne gave his support 
unconditionally to the external faction led by Ben Bella.54 
2.5.3 The Reign of Ben Bella 
Ben Bella was appointed Prime Minister of Algeria in 1962 and in the subsequent year 
elected president of Algeria. He set about establishing Algeria's socialist state, but 
scandals and corruption infused his regime and ultimately led to his downfall. One by one 
former colleagues fell by the wayside or were purged. Ferhat Abbas, a prominent 
member of the FLN who had helped Ben Bella to power disagreed with Ben Bella's anti 
-western policies and was expelled from the FLN. In 1963 Khider resigned from the post 
of secretary-general of the FLN. Within days Ben Bella's Foreign Secretary Mohamed 
Khemisti was assassinated. In June of the same year Boudiafwas arrested on Ben Bella's 
orders and Ait Ahmed declared he would fight Ben Bella announcing publicly "Are we in 
a country of Duvelier ...... or are we in Algeria?". He then took to the mountains with the 
former Kabyle leader Colonel Mohand Ou el Hadj. By the end ofthe year Ben Bella was 
53. Ibid. 22. 
54. Ibid. 23. 
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at war over territorial rights with the King of Morocco or the roi Jantoche, un criminel as 
he was referred to by Ben Bella.55 
In 1964 Ben Bella's residence came under fire, and anned revolt broke out around Biskra 
led by Colonel Chaabani. Ait Ahmed and Khider supported the revolt, with the latter 
declaring that the regime was slipping dangerously towards fascism and totalitarianism. 
With the aid of Boumedienne's troops, Chaabani was rounded up and executed and Ait 
Ahmed imprisoned. Khider fled to Switzerland, together with the FLN treasury so 
painstakingly collected from Algerians in France and at home during the war. He was 
followed into exile by Abbas and Bitat, and others of the old guard.56 
It was during this period that Ben Bella came to depend progressively more on the 
support of Boumedienne and the army. Despite his integral part played in Ben Bella's 
victory, Boumedienne remained in the background. It appears that at this stage his only 
ambition was to make the newly established Armee Nationale Popu/aire (ANP) a 
powerful and united army. 57 This task presented great difficulties as it required merging 
hostile forces such as the guerrilla commanders, the outside army and those who had 
professional training in the French army. This task was compounded by Ben Bella 
playing off rivalries between guerrilla colonels and Boumedienne in order to weaken the 
latter's position. Ben Bella appointed Tahar Zbiri, a wi/aya commander, Chief of the 
General Staff in order to undermine Boumedienne's position and to placate dissatisfied 
wi/aya leaders. Boumedienne was not consulted about the appointment and was 
negotiating an arms deal with the Russians at the time. He apparently learnt about the 
appointment from his hosts. He stated subsequently: "[Ben Bella] knew perfectly 
welL.that I would have viewed favourably the nomination of brother Tahar ... [but] he 
waited for me to leave in order to make brother Tahar believe that he had been named 
against my will ... Ben Bella never ceased to describe us [Zbiri and Boumedienne] to each 
55. A. Home, A Savage War of Peace, op. cit., 541. 
56, Ibid. 541. 
57. D. and M. Ottaway, op. cit., 178. 
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other as sworn enemies.,,58 As a result of Ben Bella's machinations and Boumedienne's 
policy of favouring French trained officers over the former guerrilla commanders, the 
. d d' 'ded 59 army remame IVI • 
With most of Ben Bella's rivals dead, in prison, or exiled, he finally felt a sense of 
security. It is therefore ironic that in June 1965 the same man who had helped him into 
power dethroned him of that power. Although himself under sentence of death by Ben 
Bella, Ait Ahmed warned him that there would be coup against him. The following 
statement issued by Boumedienne to the Algerian people presents the overt reason for the 
coup, 
"The ANP will never let it be cut off from the people, from whom it finds both its 
strength and reason for being." "he [Ben Bella] made us look like bloodthirsty 
men." "The execution of this vile plot and diabolical idea was to be reinforced on 
the political level by the denigration of the junud of the Army of Liberation by 
calling them 'militarists' and 'fascists.' In fact our junud are simply the sons of 
fellahin and of workers who have fought to recover their lands and their 
factories .. .! am not simply talking of the soldiers in general, the majority of the 
poor fellahin and workers who possess nothing; I am speaking of the officers, 
who have the same doctrine and the same orientation as the Party and the country, 
that is, who should conform to the policies of the country." "We are not an army 
of mercenaries. We are above all militants, children of fellahin and workers, 
intellectuals and nationalists worthy of the name ... [We] are the people, [we] are 
the Revolution .. .If [the army] rose up again to straighten out deviationism, ... this 
cannot be called a military coup d' eta!. All they did was to assume their 
revolutionary responsibilities towards the people.,,60 
58. D. and M. Ottaway, op. cit., 178. 
59. Ibid. 17. 
60. W. Zartman, Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Maghreb, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973,217. 
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The reasons for the coup were numerous, ranging from the preservation of the ideologies 
of the revolution, to corruption and the bitter animosity that had developed between the 
two men. Boumedienne had at last arrived.61 
2.5.4 The Reign of Boumedienne 
Obsessed with order and careful never to interfere with a task once it is given, he is 
incapable of arbitrating or settling administrative conflicts. An enemy of official abuse, 
he nevertheless depends on the military and police apparatus that is fostering repression 
and despotism; a stickler for law, he signs orders for judicial reforms that wipe out in a 
single stroke what was left ofjustice ... Because he is better suited to command than to 
govern Bownedienne is a prisoner of his personality, of his past and of the men around 
him. 
Herve Bourges62 
After the coup of 1965 Boumedienne established the Council of Revolution. The council 
was comprised of twenty-six men, mostly army officers and former wilaya leaders. 
Twelve of these men at the time either belonged to the ANP general staff, or were 
commanders of military regions.63 All but two had been members of the ALN.64 The core 
or Oudja Group of this council consisted of Boumedienne's war time associates, Ahmed 
Kaid, CherifBelgasem, Ahmed Medeghri, and Abdelaziz Bouteflika.65 This at least 
created a cohesive internal governing elite. 
61. A. Horne, A Savage Waro/Peace, op. cit., 540·541. 
62. W.B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria. 1954·1968, Cambridge, The Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology,1969,262. 
63. Library of Congress, op. cit. 
64. W. Zartman, op. cit., 25. 
65. D. and M. Ottaway, op. cit, 192. 
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In mid December 1967, ex guerrilla commander Tahar Zbiri, one of Boumedienne' s 
accomplices in the 1965 coup, fearing that the revolutionary fighters would be replaced 
by newly hired technicians attempted to overthrow the govemment.66 The rebellion was 
squashed within hours. Boumedienne used the opportunity to remove all guerrilla fighters 
from positions of authority. To further consolidate his control over the ANP, he dissolved 
the general staff and assumed many of the staffresponsibilities.67 
During Boumedienne's reign Khider, 'Who had fled with the FLN treasury, was 
assassinated in Madrid in 1967.68 Krim, who went into exile after the coup which brought 
Boumedienne into power, formed an opposition group and publicly announced that 
"seven years of independence have been worse than seven years of war". He was 
condemned to death in abstentia for treason and accused of attempting to overthrow 
Boumedienne. Although he always travelled well armed, after the Palestinian hijacking 
of a plane in the autumn of 1970, airport security was increased. His revolver, which he 
always carried with him, was confiscated at an airport. In October 1970 he was found 
strangled to death in a hotel room in Frankfurt.69 Boumedienne's elimination of any 
opposition extended beyond the borders of Algeria and the assassinations were probably 
performed by the Securite Militaire. Its members, trained by eastern European friends of 
Algeria, earned a reputation for ruthlessly pursuing dissidents inside and outside the 
regime. 70 
Boumedienne constantly asserted that the socialist state of Algeria was not the instrument 
of a military regime or an officer caste and he and his top aides never appeared in public 
in military uniform. Nonetheless, many experienced military personnel entered ministries 
as part of the national elite. Moreover, military management also played a part in civic-
66. E. Hermassi, op. cit., 167. 
67. Library of Congress, op. cit. 
68. B. Madani, 2001 May, Algeria: Stronghold ofLe Pouvoir, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, 3 (5). 
69. World Amazigh Action Coalition, op. cit. 
70. M. Stone, The Agony of Algeria, London, Hurst and Company, 1997, 136. 
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action and economic development projects, and regional commanders often became more 
influential in local affairs than the governors of certain regions. 71 
Under Boumedienne, by 1972 ninety percent of the Algerian army had been equipped 
with Soviet sources. Initially the army was filled with ALN members, but later in the 
I 970s a younger technocratic officer class was beginning to replace them. Although 
many of them trained abroad in France, the Soviet Union and some even in the United 
States, Algeria itself had some prestigious military schools, such as Cherchell, the former 
French officer school. Boumedienne gradually replaced conservative, older commanders 
with younger officers.72 
The Council of Revolution was dissolved late in 1968. In the early 1970's only nine of its 
past members were still active in government, although all with military backgrounds and 
three of them were still in military command. Ofthe Oudja group only Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika remained.73 However, throughout this period an army watchdog remained 
made up of top colonels who were also senior men in military affairs. This group 
included most of the former members of the Council of Revolution, notably the 
commanders of the military regions. When Boumedienne suddenly became ill, the 
remaining members of the Council of Revolution were re-awakened to oversee the power 
transformation. This group, backed by the army, made the firm decision to guarantee that 
the succession would follow the correct constitutional procedures and that the successor 
would be acceptable to the army, for the sole purpose of averting a military COUp.74 
71. Library of Congress, op. cit. 
72. M. Stone, op. cit., 130-131. 
73. W. Zartman, op. cit., 26. 
74. Ibid. 28. 
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2.5.5 The Reign of Benjedid 
When Benjedid came into power in 1979, he consolidated his authority by eliminating all 
serious contenders from the government sphere.75 His new regime was nonetheless 
dominated by a military elite. Unlike Boumedienne, Benjedid's military elite did not 
dominate the government as a single conspiratorial group, but rather as a guardian ofthe 
regime and a reservoir of personnel. The members of this elite dominated because they 
were close to Benjedid and had worked with him before. There appeared to be three 
requirements for membership in Benjedid's entourage, none however were necessary or 
sufficient conditions, but these conditions did facilitate entry. They involved: origin in the 
Annaba-Constantine region, experience in the French army and service in the Oranais 
region.76 The army therefore reverted to its guardian role, but left a powerful group of its 
leaders around Benjedid whose entire career was in active military service.77 
Benjedid's rule was infused with coercion and force as methods of maintaining control. 
Protests were dealt with harshly when the regime believed they were getting out of hand. 
This was especially true with regard to Amazigh and Islamist demonstrations. In 1982, 
following repeated protests by Islamists, the government suppressed and arrested the 
Islamist leaders. The establishment by Amazigh individuals of the Algerian League of 
Human Rights in 1986 was short-lived and its members also arrested and imprisoned.78 
Accusations of corruption were used against troublesome political figures, such as 
Bouteflika. The Algerians popularly proclaimed the Court of Accounts, used to handle 
matters of corruption, the Court for Settling Accounts. Furthermore, once Benjedid took 
control regular arrests without charges took place. One of these arrests included Ali 
Yahya, a respected lawyer and former minister. The use of the judicial system as a 
method of gaining control showed that the regime would use all methods to maintain 
domination and defend itselr,79 
75. J.L. Esposito, and lO. Voll, Islam and Democracy, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996, 66. 
76. W. Zartman, op. cit., 36. 
77. Ibid. 42. 
78. H. Roberts, Radical Islamism and the Dilemma of Algerian Nationalism, Third World Quarterly, 10 (2), 1988,588. 
79. Ibid. 31·32. 
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In the mid 1980s Algeria, whose oil revenues accounted for 90% of its exports, felt the 
crippling impact of the oil glut and falling energy prices. This failure of the state-run 
economy, because of the oil crisis, a growing national debt of about 24 billion dollars and 
a 30% inflation rate, had a severe effect on all aspects of life. As a result tensions 
worsened between the ruling elite and the majority of the population who felt the impact 
of the austerity measures that the ruling minority implemented.8o Benjedid progressively 
abandoned Boumedienne's socialist economic project in favour of a more liberalised 
economy which inevitably led to job losses as the over manned, inefficient state 
industries were streamlined. These redundancies added to an already serious 
unemployment rate in Algeria. A further contributing factor was the country's high birth 
rate. During 1980-1984 the population grew from 18.3 million to 21.6 million. In 1986 it 
was estimated that almost 75% of Algerians between the ages of 16-25 were 
unemployed.81 Food shortages increased and government inefficiency and corruption 
worsened. The youth were especially vocal in expressing their discontent with the 
growing inequality. The slogans chanted by youths during international football matches 
attended by high ranking government officials, provide evidence of their disenchantment. 
Chants such as "A room, a kitchen is better than the castle ofHalima" (President 
Benjedid's wife) were proclaimed, and "For us, only Artane (an anti-Parkinson's disease 
drug popular with the poor); or Al-zetla (cannabis) or exile". 82 
On October 4, 1988 about 5 000 youths went on a rampage in Bab el-Oued, an 
overcrowded, poverty stricken suburb of Algiers. The demonstrators were protesting high 
unemployment, lack of basic consumer goods and affordable housing in cities. They 
destroyed centres of prestige such as the Blue Note night-club, the Ryad el-Feth shopping 
centre, the rendezvous of the sons and daughters of the elite, the chi-chis. The violence 
continued for three days until the government imposed a state of siege on October 7 and 
gave permission to the army to shoot on sight and to use automatic weapons. Despite the 
presence of the army, the riots spread to Oran, Annaba, Mostaganem, Blida and many 
80. J.L. Esposito, and 1.0. Voll, op. cit., 154. 
81. M. Willis, lslamist Challenge in Algeria, New York, New York University Press, 1996,99. 
82. M. Vergis, Genesis of Mobilisation: The Young Activists of Algeria's fslamic Salvation Front, In Politicallslam, Joel Benin 
and Joe Stork, Eds, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1997,296. 
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other towns and cities across the country. The number killed ranged between 200-500. 
Over 3 500 people were arrested and a large number tortured. On October 10, 100 
protesters gathered at the Place de Martyrs in central Algiers to hear Ali Belhadj, a young 
influential and charismatic preacher speak. The meeting was deemed an illegal Islamist 
gathering and the security forces opened fIre on the crowd killing forty people. Algerians 
were stunned by the display of force which fInally and defmitively destroyed the myth of 
the military as the symbol of the honourable guarantor of the revolution. 83 
2.6 Conclusion 
Algerian society has been habitualised to the use of violence ever since they gained 
independence in a violent war. A pattern of purges, assassinations and killings appear to 
mark the behaviour of the Algerian governing elite. Ben Bella purged his regime of those 
who opposed him. Boumedienne lessened any opposition to his rule through purges at 
home and where necessary abroad following largely in the footsteps ofms predecessor, 
but with more success. Benjedid similarly followed in the footsteps of his predecessors 
by dealing forcibly with opposition, most notably Islamist and Amazigh opposition and 
finally with the economically underprivileged. The successive leaders of independent 
Algeria, with the exception of Ben Bella whose reign was short-lived, came from the 
military and an elite military group has always been present throughout, as 
Boumedienne's Council of Revolution and Oudja group and Benjedid's inner circle. 
83. M. Stone, op. cit., 64·66. 
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3. THE CONFLICT 
In the name of democracy, you have cancelled elections. In the name of human rights and 
western-style modernity you have adopted the methods of terror, allowed not long ago by 
Guy Mollet and Francois Mitterand..mass arrests, arbitrary internment, systematic 
torture. It is from Vichy you borrowed the 'special courts' and the monstrous principle of 
retroactive application of the penal law. You will try to deny me the right to proclaim the 
truth: you have turned torturers or torturers' accomplices. You could not have a worse 
fate pity you ... 
3.1 Introduction 
Jacques Verges-French lawyer and member of the 
FLN during the war ofliberation84 
The following chapter deals with the conflict which followed the 1992 coup. This chapter 
is similarly divided into sections in order to create a more coherent portrayal of the 
conflict. The first deals with the conflict and the participants generally. The second 
focuses more specifically on the military as a participant. The third deals with the 
behaviour of the military during the conflict~ and finally, the fourth section discusses the 
international support for the Algerian military elite. 
84. J. Verges, Letter /0 Algerian Friends, Friends who have Turned Torturers, [Online), Available: 
http://www.aliasoftcomlthemes/alger.html. [19 December 2002], 2000. 
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3.2 The Conflict and its Participants 
3.2.1 Introduction 
When the 1988 riots were over, President Benjedid met with Muslim leaders, who 
forcibly condemned acts of violence and sabotage and submitted proposals for economic 
and social reform based on Islamic principles. In February 1989 a new constitution was 
voted in by a national referendum and amongst its most notable features was the 
complete elimination of any reference to socialism or socialist principles.85 Other 
constitutional changes included, amongst others, unrestricted freedoms of expression, 
association, and organisation found in Article 39 of the constitution; the right to unionise 
and strike in Articles 53 and 54 and most importantly the right to form "associations of a 
political nature" found in Article 40. The last mentioned provision established a 
multiparty system that was fonnally entrenched in the enabling law of July 5, 1989. It 
had taken only nine months to transform the single party authoritarian Algerian regime 
into a multi-party, pluralistic state. Approximately 30 political parties were officially 
recognised and registered.86 The introduction of multi-party elections in 1989 saw the 
emergence of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) an Islamist group. 
3.2.2 The Role of Islam pre-1989 
In the first chapter reference was made to the AUMA under the leadership of Ben Badis. 
During the fight for independence the AUMA was subsumed under the banner of the 
FLN, but once independence was achieved this union broke down. Despite its presence in 
the independence struggle, a leading role after independence could not be achieved. The 
dominance of the FLN could be attributed to the fact that the AUMA had retained its 
religious and cultural character and was unable to consolidate a separate political 
framework. Alistair Home attributed the political eclipse of the AUMA to the fact that its 
leadership was unsuited to political activism because, ''tied up in their theological coils, 
85. J. Entilis, Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized, Kent, Croom Helm Ltd, 1986,228. 
86. Ibid. 229. 
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they failed to find pragmatic applications for their doctrines.,,87 As a result the FLN came 
into power and the Popular Republic of Algeria was fonned. The failure of the AUMA to 
concretise its doctrine was a problem that the subsequent manifestations of Islamist 
groups in Algeria also experienced. 
Although their ideas were essentially secular and socialist, both Ben Bella and 
Boumedienne realised that an Islamic cultural component would help achieve national 
synthesis.88 As a result both worked towards showing support for the Arabisation of the 
country. The schools were slowly Arabisied and religious education was instituted at 
school. Boumedienne also held a constitutional and presidential referendum and endorsed 
the New National Charter of 1976, which gave Islam the status of state religion. In March 
of the same year gambling was outlawed and in August, Friday replaced Saturday as the 
official weekly holiday.89 In 1964 Ben Bella also authorised the creation of the Qiyam 
(Values) Association to lobby Islamic issues in the educational, linguistic, and cultural 
spheres. However, when the Qiyam Association stepped into the political sphere in 1970 
by protesting the execution of Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, it was 
shut down.9o 
The Arabisation afforded Islam more prominence and therefore the belief that the Islamic 
voice could become more vocaL However, the secularist regime was not prepared to give 
Islam any political power. Therefore, as soon as the Qiyam Association entered the 
political realm, it was shut down. The regime was sending a clear message- we will take 
cognisance of the importance of Islam, but it can never be a political force. The 
suppression oflslamists would continue under Boumedienne's successor Benjedid, and 
would reach its zenith after the coup of 1992. 
87. Ibid. 32. 
88. J. Ruedy, Continuities and Discontinuities in Algerian Confrontation with Europe, In Islamism and Secularism in North 
Africa,John Ruedy and John Douglas, Eds, New York, St Martins Press, 1994, 79. 
89. M. Willis, op. cit, 46. 
90. Ibid. 80. 
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3.2.3 Front Islamique du Salut 
The FIS was an umbrella organisation established in 1989 under the leadership of Shaykh 
Ali Abbasi Madani, a moderate, religious, Western educated professor at the University 
of Algiers, and Ali Belhadj, a more religiously radical and younger man. 
Abbasi Madani, the son of an imam, was born in south-eastern Algeria. He was a member 
of the FLN and was imprisoned for eight years during the French occupation, and for four 
years under Benjedid. In 1978, Madani received a British doctorate in education and 
taught at the University of Algiers where once again he became politically active. He 
condemned outright the government's failures and advocated an Islamic alternative. He 
was arrested and imprisoned for two years for his political activism. Later, when the 
government liberalised its stance towards the Islamists, Madani and other Islamists were 
able to preach and organise in mosques, schools and universities.91 Madani was critical of 
the FLN, however, he projected an image of reason and was moderate in his discourse. 
He was furthermore, publicly supportive of democratic elections and pluralism. Belhadj, 
on the other hand, lost both parents in the war of independence, was the product of 
Islamist religious education and as a result was more confrontational in his rhetoric. He 
followed a pure Islamist line based on Sharia law.92 
This dichotomy within the FIS led to splits within the party between those who advocated 
following the democratic process and those that believed that the democratic process was 
incompatible with Islam. Furthermore, the FIS failed to formulate a political programme, 
instead its platform was based on the economic failure, corruption and inefficiencies of 
the FLN government. Once it had successfully won the municipal and provincial 
elections, the FIS began to clean up in certain municipalities and provinces. In Tipaza, 
west of Algiers FIS councillors banned shorts and swimwear in the streets although this 
ban was later repealed. Some councillors also forbade the selling of alcohol, mixed sex 
91. M. Willis, op. cit., 157. 
92. Ibid. 158. 
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education and the popular fonn of rar music in certain areas. These actions indicated that 
the FIS was embarking on a moral crusade in Algeria.93 
On May 25, 1991 on the eve of the general legislative elections, the FIS called for an 
indefinite nation-wide strike. Rallies and marches were organised in response to alleged 
government gerrymandering tactics. As a result clashes ensued with security forces who 
fired openly on protesters. A curfew was imposed and both Madani and Belhadj were 
jailed. On December 26, elections were held with the FIS winning a landslide victory.94 
As the FIS prepared for the second round of elections, its Islamist agenda became more 
pronounced with pamphlets on issues of women and Islam focusing on more orthodox 
roles of the woman as wife and mother and the obligation to wear the headscarf. 
However, the incongruencies of the FIS stance remained evident, with structural changes 
in cities which included cinemas and exceptions to the orthodox role women should play 
for professional women and those who were divorced or widowed.9s 
3.2.4 The Coup 
On January 12, 1992, the Algerian military, disregarding the majority of voters, 
intervened in what was a de facto coup to prevent the FIS from taking its rightful position 
in government. The coup was planned by senior military officials including, most notably 
Khaled Nezzar, then Minister of Defence, the commanders of the military regions, the 
leaders of the navy, the gendarmerie and security forces. 96 In the name of security 
preservation and stability these men, aware that the FIS was poised for another electoral 
victory that would have afforded them a two-thirds to 80% majority victory in 
parliament, acted. They forced President Benjedid to resign thereby creating a 
93. M. Stone, op. cit., 167. 
94. M-J. Deeb, Militant Islam and the Politics of Redemption. In The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Charles E Butterworth and WiIliam Zartman, Eds. Newbury Park, Sage Publications, 1992,56-57. 
95. M. Stone, op. cit., 172. 
96. M. Willis, op. cit, 247. 
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constitutional crisis, which the military elite would use as pretence to annul the 
I . 97 e ectlOns. 
Although the formulators of the coup had planned to utilise the proper provisions of the 
Constitution to legitimise the coup, the consequences of such an action would not have 
been in their favour. Once Benjedid resigned, his successor would be the president of the 
National Assembly, Abdelaziz Belkhadem, who was perceived as far too sympathetic 
towards the FIS. However, they remained anxious to preserve what Francois Burgat 
terms, 'a legalistic fac;ade'. They therefore planned that when Benjedid resigned, he 
would cede power to the Haut Comite Securite (HCS) which would appoint his 
successor. The legal fac;ade was that the HCS was a body already in existence and 
provided for by the Constitution.98 The HCS immediately declared a state of emergency, 
annulled the December election results, cancelled the second round and further elections 
were postponed indefinitely. On February 9, 1992 the military onslaught began. 
Journalists, whether Islamist or not, were jailed and most newspaper agencies were 
closed. In March 1992, the FIS was banned. Leaders, members and those sympathetic to 
the FIS cause were arrested and tortured. It is estimated that more than 10 000 Islamists 
were detained in concentration camps in the Sahara. Mosques and social welfare centres 
set up by the FIS were closed. Imams that had shown any signs of sympathy for the plight 
of the FIS were arrested for using the pUlpit for political purposes.99 
The HCS subsequently set up the Haut Comite d'Etat (HCE), a five member transitional 
body that would act as a collective presidency. The HCE mirrored the Council of 
Revolution established by Boumedienne in 1965 to legitimise his coup. Boudiaf, a 
wartime FLN political operator, was selected to chair the HCE. Ben Bella had forced him 
into exile in 1963-4 because of political disagreements. However, his status as a wartime 
hero and absence during the crisis at the start of independence and in 1992 made him a 
suitable candidate. Nonetheless, maintaining effective control was General Khaled 
97. J. Entelis, Islam, Democracy, and the State: The Reemergence of Authoritarian Politics in Algeria, In lslamism and 
Secularism in North Africa, John Ruedy and John Douglas, Eds. New York, St Martins Press, 1994,219. 
98. M. Willis, op. cit, 249. 
99. J.L. Esposito, and J.O. Voll, op. cit., 166. 
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Nezzar, the most powerful member of the HCE, once again illustrating the power grip the 
military had on Algeria. lOo Boudiafs reign was short-lived. His anti-corruption stance 
threatened the privileged and he was assassinated on June 29, 1992 shortly after coming 
into power. IOl The authorities protected the culprits and the assassination was never 
satisfactorily explained much the same as those of early FLN leaders such as Mohamed 
Khider and Krim Belkacem.102 In August 1992 the HCE passed legislation allowing the 
army extensive powers to deal with terrorists and insurgents and in October 1992 Nezzar 
appointed a group of young generals to root out the terrorists. 103 The re-appearance of 
torture was an inescapable consequence of the HCE's anti-terrorist campaign.104 In 1994 
the HCE called for a 'national consensus conference' to establish a new transitional 
government and to choose a president. And, as the army had chosen Benjedid to succeed 
Boumedienne, so too did the committee chose one of its own, Lamine Zeroual, Minister 
of Defence to lead the country. 105 
The more precise reasons afforded for the intervention were: the protection of Algeria 
from economic turmoil; radical Islam; and collapse into civil war. For many senior 
officers a FIS government meant disaster, both politically and economically for the 
Algeria they had pledged to defend. 106 In addition, the governments of North African 
countries had met several months earlier and had already rationalised the groundwork for 
intervention to combat radical Islam. 107 The military elite also feared that the fragile 
economic conditions of the country would worsen if the FIS came into power. The 
national debt had reached an estimated $25 billion in 1991 and this the leaders of the 
coup believed would double through capital flight and the withdrawal of foreign petrol 
companies. Of more immediate concern was the fact that there were already indications 
that opponents of the FIS were preparing for an armed struggle against the Islamic 
100. M. Stone. op. cit., 103. 
101. Ibid. 109. 
102. Ibid. 109-110. 
103. Ibid. 110. 
104. Ibid. 103-115. 
lOS. Ibid. 116. 
106. M. Willis, op. cit., 245. 
107. 1.L. Esposito, and J.O. Voll, op. cit., 166. 
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government and therefore the threat of a civil war could not be ruled out. 108 The Amazigh 
stronghold of Kabylia was the only area in which the FIS failed to triumph in the 1991 
elections. The FIS was viewed as posing a threat to Kabylian interests, which centred on 
demands for recognition of Tamazight as an official language alongside Arabic, the right 
to promote their culture, and secularism.109 
However, of overwhelming concern was the fact that the military elite was anxious about 
its own integrity and survival if the FIS achieved a majority in the National Assembly. 
The military elite feared that the FIS would try to neutralise its traditional foes in the 
general staff of the military. The FIS' s declaration that it would secure the release of all 
of its members and supporters arrested in the June 1991 uprising and prosecuted by the 
military court, indicated a clear challenge to the all-important authority of the military. I 10 
Indeed, the FIS made it clear that it would not tolerate army interference in domestic 
politics under any circumstances. Abbasi Madani, actually warned the army not to, 
descend onto the streets. If one drop of blood should be spilled, I swear to God 
that we will fight the army to its complete destruction. I II 
Madani also espoused socialist rhetoric which threatened the economic interest of the 
military elite. The military elite therefore felt that if it was to block an FIS victory it had 
to do so before the second round of elections. 
Since negotiations failed to restore the FIS to power, disillusioned members of the FIS 
decided to take up arms. The group they established became known as the Arme 
Islamique du Salut (AIS).112 Other groups with their own agendas were formed amidst 
the chaos. The pervasive repression and torture were salient factors in spearheading 
108. M. Willis, op. cit, 245. 
109. B. Maddy Weitzman, Islamic Challenge in North Africa, Terrorism and Political Violence, 8 (1-2), 1996,183. 
110. M. Willis, op. cit, 245. 
Ill. 1. Entelis, op. cit., 239. 
112. Its formation is discussed more comprehensively later. 
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extremist guerrilla groups in Algeria.113 In addition, the manifest failure of the FrS's 
'legalist' strategy strengthened the conviction of more radical lslamist groups that had 
remained outside the party that only an armed struggle could bring down the regime. I 14 
The most dominant extremist group was the Group Islamique Arme (OIA), which had as 
its objective the establishment of an Islamic state. ll5 The group's methods of attack were 
and remain brutal, focusing not only on military personnel, but also civilians who failed 
to ascribe to its notion of Islam. However, allegations remain rife that the military 
infiltrated the OIA and was responsible for the violence it perpetrated. 1l6 
The OIA was initially formed by Mansour Meliani, who used the name for three small 
groups he had brought under his leadership.111 However, his leadership lasted only a few 
weeks before security forces arrested him. Meliani was succeeded by Abdelhak Layada 
who bought in two further groups under the banner of the OIA. The OIA, believed in the 
establishment of an Islamic state through force of arms. Layada has asserted that, 
We reject the religion of democracy. We affirm that political pluralism is equal to 
sedition. It has never been our intention to participate in elections or enter 
parliament. Besides, the right to legislate belongs solely to OOd. 118 
Initially the OIA was predominately characterised by guerrilla warfare against the 
security services and by sabotage and bomb attacks against state-run institutions. 
However, later the defmition of legitimate targets was expanded to include anyone who 
represented the regime, such as journalists and included foreign nationals living in 
Algeria.119 Soon after, the OIA became more purist in its advocacy of unbridled violence. 
Its members burnt schools, murdered women who were immodestly dressed, used car 
113. M. Willis, op. cit., 282. 
114. Ibid. 268. 
115. M. Willis, op. cit, 281. 
116. 8. Maddy Weitzman, op. cit., 183. 
117. Ibid. 280. 
118. Ibid. 282. 
119. Ibid. 283. 
45 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
bombs in crowded cities and hijacked an Air France jetliner. This approach has been 
likened to Frantz Fanon's teachings on the cleansing, purifying properties of violence. 120 
The collapse of attempts at dialogue between the regime and the FIS forced the FIS to 
reassess its political strategy. The failed talks confirmed the party's fears that the regime 
would never be prepared to make any fruitful concessions in negotiations. As a result 
defections to the GIA became rampant as members of the FIS became convinced that 
they would never be able to defeat the regime unless a military strategy was adopted. 
Moreover, very prominent members of the FIS had decided to defect. 121 This placed 
obvious pressure on the remainder of the FIS leaders to respond. The defections were 
portrayed by the GIA as a form of unification with the FIS under the banner of the GIA. 
This was considered unacceptable to the FIS who believed that the proclaimed unification 
would threaten the name of the FIS and the degree of popular legitimacy the group had 
fought hard to accrue since 1989. The FIS therefore fervently denounced the unification. 
However, the FIS realised that condemnation of the GIA was an insufficient response to 
the challenges the GIA represented. The strength the GIA had gained concerned the FIS 
as it realised that it would further limit the chances of striking a deal with the regime. 
Firstly, by negotiating for its rightful place the FIS would lose popular support to the 
GIA. Secondly, the very real concern existed that hard-liners in the regime would deny 
any form of negotiations with any Islamists because of the increasingly bloody and 
indiscriminate campaign launched by the GIA. 122 
The FIS therefore realised the need to create its own armed wing. The reasons for this 
were twofold. Firstly, it would prevent the GIA from dominating the armed struggle and 
thereby threatening any commitments made by the party in negotiations with the regime. 
Secondly, it was hoped that it would prevent the mass defections. This however, proved a 
formidable task since the GIA had acquired a strong standing with the defections. 
Fortunately, more Islamists were to join, not from the release of those in the detention 
120. B. Maddy Weitzman, op. cit., 182. 
121. M. Willis, op. cit., 325. 
122. Ibid. 326. 
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camps in the Sahara, but from a mass prison break-out from the Tazoult prison in 1994 
which freed over a thousand lslamist activists, including very senior members. The time 
spent in prison had strengthened the convictions of these individuals. The various groups 
were unified, and in July of the same year the AIS was created. This armed struggle was 
subordinated to the political leadership of the FIS. 123 
Since its formation, the AIS has made a point of distinguishing itself from other lslamist 
organisations. It rejected the OIA's ideology and war strategy as it saw its struggle as 
political and remained strictly within the confines of a military operation. The group has 
been recorded to assert that: 
The apostate regime today attributes to the jihad certain abominable operations of 
which the defenceless people have been victims .... These untruths lead the Armee 
lslamique du Salut to reply that it is innocent of all those acts and has never given 
an order to attack a woman, to burn a school or hospital, or for any other 
operation contrary to our religion. 124 
Ultimately the AIS saw the OIA as harming the cause. The OIA's ideology of installing 
an Islamic state, and its application of imported Middle Eastern ideologies irritated the 
people and turned support away from the Islamists. The AIS has stated that: 
Jihad is not a suicide which those in dead end situations take as a solution, those 
are wretched characters; nor is it vengeance for the benefit for those who want to 
settle scores, those are motivated by hatred, nor is it an adventure with an 
uncertain outcome, started by adventurers and outlaws; nor an anarchist 
movement recruiting all the hotheads without standards or rules of life; nor is it a 
matter of blind honour such as is practised by the ignorant; nor a leap forward 
with closed eyes, which would mean a lack of vision and programme.125 
123. Ibid. 327. 
124. L. Martinez, The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998, London, C, Hurst & Co, Ltd. 2000, 203. 
125. Ibid. 204. 
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Besides the role played by the GIA in wreaking havoc amongst groups and within the 
country, the Algerian military too has been instrumental in causing chaos in the ranks of 
Muslim militants. Tactics included publishing false statements in the name of an Islamist 
organisation, or accusations levelled at one group of masteIminding the killing of a 
prominent member of another group. Rumours abound. One which caused great concern 
was the rumour that the GIA planned to kill imprisoned Abbasi Madani's daughter, who 
reputedly does not wear a veil, and blame her death on the authorities. 126 The military 
also tried to gain the upper hand in the struggle by other illegitimate means. A riot in the 
Sekardji jail in Algiers resulted in the deaths of predominately Islamist prisoners, most 
notably Ahmed EI Wed, a founder of the GIA. The official death toll was reported as 96. 
The authorities claimed that the response was necessary to prevent an attempted break-
out. There were, however, strong suspicions amongst Islamists and others that the affair 
had been orchestrated by the regime in order to wipe out a number ofIslamists to avenge 
a car bomb explosion outside the main police station in Algiers. FIS sources claimed that 
the number of Islamists killed was as high as 230. The military regime also believed that 
elimination of the Islamists would prevent re-entry into armed groups through breakouts 
or amnesties. The military controlled government advocated a one-track policy of 
eliminating the Islamist threat. 127 
In April 1999 the Algerian people went to the polls for the fourth time in four years in an 
attempt to end the perpetual violence that had consumed their country since the Algerian 
military elite abrogated elections in 1992. In distinct contrast to the 1997 legislative 
elections that were relatively free and included a fair amount of legalised Islamic parties, 
in the 1999 elections 6 of the 7 presidential candidates boycotted the election. Turnout 
was extremely low and the victor, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, an ageing member of the FLN, 
appeared to be the hand picked candidate of the Algerian military elite. However, 
contrary to popular expectations, June brought a cease-fire between the government and 
the FIS. In a further attempt to ease unrest the concorde civile adopted by the Assemblee 
126. W.H. Miller, Insurgency theory and the Conflict in Algeria: A Theoretical Analysis, Terrorism and Political Violence, 12, 
2000,75. 
127. M. Willis, op. cit., 347. 
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Populaire Nationale granted amnesty to approximately 20 000 insurgents and political 
prisoners. 128 Despite, the amnesty agreements violence still continues and attention is 
being focused on Le Pouvoir, the military kingpins as the men responsible for the 
violence that has engulfed Algeria for over a decade. 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
The initial onslaught began with the military and in an atmosphere riddled with violence 
other groups emerged. As illustrated above, the GIA's behaviour has been extremely 
violent, nonetheless members of the military have also used underhanded techniques in 
their attempt to eradicate the Islamist threat. The focus of the following two parts is 
specifically on the military and more importantly, the military elite. 
128. W.H. Miller, op. cit, 75. 
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3.3 The Military 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The ANP always viewed itself as protector of the revolutionary ideals. However, after the 
coup and the purges which succeeded it, the army's reputation was severely tarnished 
resulting in the establishment of the Free Officers Group. This group sought to distance 
itself from the atrocities which had been perpetrated against the Algerian people whom 
the Algerian army had sworn to protect. Following the coup which brought Boumedienne 
into power an elite group of military men have wielded extensive power in Algerian 
political life. The following details the role of the ANP and the military elite in the 
unfolding of a war which has taken between 100 000 and 150 000 thousand Algerian 
lives. 
3.3.2 The ANP 
In Algeria the largest and most coherent organisation is the army. In the mid 1990s it had 
the dubious honour of being the largest in the Maghreb and one of the most powerful in 
the Arab world. The most recent statistics placed the military as comprising 138000 men, 
70 000 of whom were conscripts on eighteen month service. The rest was made up of 5 
500 men in the navy, 12 000 in the air force and 23 000 gendarmes.129 
The wealth disparity between high ranking officers and the rest of the rank and file has 
always been disproportionate. Desirable real estate was often channelled to army officers 
at very low prices and senior army officers were granted luxury villas. The rest of the 
army, especially those stationed in the desert, lived in particularly poor living conditions. 
The majority of the conscripts viewed their life in the army as one better forgotten. Do The 
crisis subsequent to the coup also highlighted the overburdened and inefficient military 
bureaucracy. Moreover, the rank and file were poorly trained, equipped and commanded 
129. M. Stone, op. cit., 130. 
130. Ibid. 131. 
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and as a result suffered high casualty rates during the initial stages of the conflict. The 
company commanders were therefore obliged to refer most decisions to senior officers 
who often spoke of hard-line security measures without going into too much detail. 131 
As a resul t of the brutal eradication campaign advocated by senior military officials, the 
army's reputation continued to dwindle.132 From statements issued by senior military 
personnel, the eradication was justified because the Islamists would destroy the Algeria 
the army had fought so hard to secure in its fight for independence. The following is a 
statement issued by General Khaled Nezzar, 
Democracy does not mean anarchy, freedom of expression cannot be synonymous 
with violence and intimidation. It would be intolerable of men coming to power 
through democracy to lead us to dictatorship ... What have all the achievements of 
the ANP since independence come to if people come to cast doubt on the 
authenticity of its roots as well as the respectability of its structures? Does not a 
holy verse in the Koran proclaim, 'If a depraved man brings you news, get proof 
together first, for fear of doing people wrong through ignorance and having to 
regret one fine day what you have done,?133 
Although various statements from senior members are obtainable, information from the 
rank and file is limited. At the outset of the war it was however hoped that the army 
would support the Islamists, however this was not the case. The incomprehension of the 
army to come to terms with the Islamists is most aptly expressed by a young student in an 
Algiers suburb, 
It is disheartening, I swear to you, I don't understand why the army is defending 
the communist. They should let them die or leave for France if they want to live 
like "kuffar" [infidels]. I don't understand why the army is not with the FIS. The 
131. Ibid. 136. 
132. Ibid. 137. 
133. L. Martinez, op. cit., 166. 
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FrS is the people, the anny must be with the people. Even though it is true there 
are some soldiers on our side but not all. 134 
As the war continued, and the brutality continued, a new voice was heard from the ANP. 
The atrocities committed which many Algerians believed were the work of the military 
led to the establishment of the Free Officers Group. This group blamed a military elite for 
the violence engulfing Algeria and issued the following proclamation, 
We officers faithful to the surmount of November the first 1954. Faithful to 
the wholly [lit] principals of the Algerian people from which we are issue. 
We proclaim solemnly with a high voice our indignation, our refusal to keep 
quiet in front of the incessant genocide of our fathers, mothers, brothers, 
sisters and children. 
The limits of the barbarism and the incredible have been once agam 
exceeded on the land of our ancestors. 
The National Popular Army has always been the symbol of honour and 
sacrifice, but the arrival of high officers (former French officers or relatives) 
to the command, took us forty years back. The clock is at the time of the 
occupation. 
For all these reasons and to follow the example of our brothers officers and 
under officers cowardly executed since the first hours of the civil war by 
other members of the Popular National Army, acting under the orders of 
Mariane, we will fight these new harkis and their alley till the last drop of 
our blood. 
134. Ibid. 67. 
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At the time where the Algerians live the darkest days of their history, it is 
advisable to incline in front of the dignity of the people, which is suffering 
silently in its flesh and its soul behind a metallic shutter. 
Glory to our Martyrs 
Glory to the Algerian people.13s 
Abdelhamid Brahimi, a former Algerian prime minister now in exile in London, also 
stated that the regular army was eclipsed by the creation of other groups responsible for 
the violence in Algeria and headed by a select group of generals. 136 One such group is 
Securite Militaire. 
Securite Militaire (SM) was and possibly remains the most effective service in Algeria. 
The head of the service in 1993 was General Mohamed Mediene. This service was part of 
Algerian history since its establishment in 1965 under Boumedienne when the coup 
leader used the service to rid the army of personnel he deemed of questionable loyalty, 
most notably the guerrilla fighters. In the 1970s the service was used extensively to 
monitor and maintain files on potential individuals who opposed the national leadership. 
SM was often less circumscribed in its operations, with cases of detention of suspects in 
undisclosed locations having been ascribed to its dealings. Later the important role of 
national security was assumed by the General Delegation for Documentation and 
Security (Delegation Generale de Documentation et Surete, DGDS). During the riots of 
1988 which claimed the lives of over 500 Algerians and widely published accounts of 
torture by this organisation and SM, the government was forced to respond. In 1990 
Benjedid announced the dissolution ofDGDS. However, after the coup of 1992, reports 
135. ANP. Surmount We officersfaithful to the surmount of November thejirst 1954. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.anp.orglengindex/altragedyengl.htm- 4k -, [7 December 2002]. 2002. 
136. S. Saad. The Horror Gripping Algeria Is Not Mindless Violence But Carefully Choreographed Chaos and Corruption, 
[Online]. Available: www.washington-report.org!backissues/0498/98040S0.html-42k- [2 July 2002].1998. 
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indicated that SM was indeed alive and well and remained the senior intelligence body 
concerned with the internal security of the country.137 
Notwithstanding Algerian predilections for rumour and conspiracy theory, the theories 
that SM was very likely involved in covert activities, which included the infiltration of its 
own agents or others into certain terrorist groups, the most notable being the OIA, were 
probably hue. The primary objective would have been to obtain information on its 
respective capabilities. There was also speculation that the SM actually organised the 
formation of certain OIA katibat (cells) and was responsible for carrying out some of the 
more horrific terrorist incidents with the sole objective of creating public revulsion 
against the OIA and by extension the entire illegal lslamist movement, thereby rallying 
support for the state. Although it is virtually impossible to prove these allegations, the 
history of covert operations during the war of independence lends them credence. 138 
3.3.3 Le Pouvoir 
For ten years, in order to preserve their privileges, the generals in Algiers have plunged 
their countly into bloody chaos through state terrorism and by manipulating violence, 
hiding behind a sophisticated system of dis information. ... 
Liberation 29 June l39 
Le Pouvoir is the name given to an elite military group. The men comprising this group 
were reputedly behind the violence in Algeria. The FIS and the Free Officers, along with 
Amnesty International and Algeria Watch, The Washington Post and the Observer, and 
the former Algerian prime minister, Abdelhamid Brahimi all maintained that a military 
137. Library of Congress, op. cit. 
138. M. Stone, op. cit., 136. 
139. Algeria Groups Network: Amnesty lnternational- UK Section, [Online]. Available: hrtp:l/www.anmesty-
volunteer.rglu.kJalgeriaJ, [9 November 2002]. 200 I. 
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elite was instrumental in the violence Algeria experienced. Five ofthe members of this 
military elite were particularly influential, namely Khaled Nezzar, Minister of Defence; 
General Mohamed Mediene, Head of Military Security; General Smain Lamari, Head of 
Counter-espionage; General Larbi Belheir, Director of President Bouteflika's Cabinet; 
and General Mohammed Lamari, Chief of Staff (Head of the Army). Specific details on 
these men are difficult to obtain.140 From various reports especially those of the Free 
Officers and the FIS, it would appear that these generals are viewed as harkis, the name 
given to Algerians who fought for the French during the war of liberation or who 
switched sides when they realised the French could no longer hang onto Algeria. A 
beseeching narrative by Jacques Vergas also alludes to the French heritage of those in 
control. 
Verges left the French Communist Party in 1957 because it opposed independence for 
Algeria. He then joined the FLN and defended many Algerian Revolutionaries. He speaks 
to a friend with whom he fought alongside in the Algerian war of liberation and who 
maintained a high post in the government service, as a member of the Higher State 
Committee and says that "You are not in the same position of some current Algerian 
generals who wait until the die was cast to join the FLN in 1958, 1959, and 1960. They 
have never claimed to be humanistS.,,141 
The only information obtainable regarding the backgrounds of these men is a short write-
up on General Khaled N ezzar by Algeria-Watch. The others appear to be shrouded by a 
cloud of mystery as reported by Amnesty International. This seems to be the case for 
most military men ever since the war of independence. William Quandt in his analysis of 
the poli tical leadership of Algeria between 1954-1968 also noted that information on the 
military men was hard to come by and most of their backgrounds were unknown. 142 
140. Ibid. 
141. J. Verges, op. cit. 
142. W.B. Quandt, op. cit, 110. 
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Khaled Nezzar trained at a military academy in Strasbourg then St-Maixent. He fought 
for the French in Germany where he attained the rank of second lieutenant. He deserted 
from the French army in April 1958. During the war of liberation he worked for the ALN 
as an instructor on the Algerian-Tunisian border where he was largely responsible for 
providing information to recruits. Later he was made an assistant to Colonel Chadli 
Benjedid, the military head of the base in Ghardimaou 143. After the coup of 1965 which 
brought Boumedienne to power, Boumedienne did away with the national defence 
portfolio to ensure his control over the ANP. The defence portfolio was revived in 1990 
by Benjedid who appointed Nezzar as head of the military. Nezzar replaced Major 
General Abdallah Bel Houchet in 1988 as a clean up after the 1988 riots 144. Amnesty 
International has however reported that neither Mediene nor Smain served in the French 
army. 145 
Possibly the most damning indictment of these men came from a young career secret 
agent in the SM, who recently defected to Britain. Yusuf-Joseph maintained that the 
violence which enveloped Algeria was perpetrated predominately by Le Pouvoir with 
Mediene and Smain Lamari being at the forefront of the massacres. He maintained that 
the bombings in 1995 which outraged Paris were not the work of Muslim extremists, but 
the handy work of the secret service in an attempt to galvanise French support for the 
current Algerian regime. He further maintained that the relentless massacres in Algeria 
were the work of the secret services. He asserted that Le Pouvoir was behind the 
massacres in order to maintain a state of fear. 146 To further strengthen the position of 
these men, a special group was created in 1992 by General Lamari Smain. This group 
was known as the L 'Escadron de fa Mort (The Squadron of Death) and had as one of its 
main missions the eradication of colonels and officers. Lending credence to his story is 
Martin Stone's remarks that retirements, dismissals and death of senior army officers 
143. Algeria-Watch, Informations sur la situation des droits humains, [Online}, Available: http://www.algeria-
watch.de/francais.htm - -[16 October 2002],2002. 
144. Library of Congress, op. cit. 
145. Algeria Groups Network, op. cit. 
146. 1. Sweeney, and L. Doyle, 1997,9 November, We Bombed Paris for Algeria, The Observer. 
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signalled a shift in the balance of power within the military favouring the zero tolerance 
line held by the military elite.147 
The generals also reputedly control the media and the lucrative industries in Algeria. 
Most newspapers are controlled by these Generals. Nouvelle Republique by General 
Khaled Nezzar, El Watan by General Mohamed Lamari, Jeune Independent, EI Khabar 
and Quotidien d'Oran by the head of military security, General Mohamed Mediene (a.k.a 
Tewfik). Cellular phones are forbidden to all except a few of the highest state officials. 
Moreover, any vocal critics of the government are usually censored and imprisoned. The 
means of attaining information is through friends and family in Algeria with the 
publication taking place in cities such as Paris, London and Montreal, since it is possible 
to bypass official Algerian media channels in these places. The reports are often then 
picked up by European and American news channels and sent back to Algeria via satellite 
links. The October 1988 riots, which were squashed by the military, were picked up by 
Radio-Beur, a Paris-based immigrant radio station. The station received telephone reports 
from witnesses and those who participated in the riots and then these were re-transmitted 
via satellite to Algerian listeners in France and in Algeria.148 
The Algerians also name each general in this military elite according to the products he 
monopolises, forinstance, general of oil, general of sugar. 149 
3.3.4 Conclusion 
The AJgerian military's reputation, as protector of the Algerian people, has been badly 
tarnished since the onset of the conflict. This has led to the establishment of the Free 
Officers Group and others speaking out against those who appear to be in the forefront of 
the war, namely Le Pouvoir. The establishment of secret organisations working 
147. M. Stone, op. cit., 136-137. 
148. P.A. Silverstein, Conspiracy Theory and the Transnationalization of the Algerian Civil War, [Online], Available: 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer214/214_silverstein.htm. [24 November 2002]. 
149. B. Madani, op. cit. 
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independently of the military, but under the control of these generals, has strengthened 
the conviction that this elite group is in control. 
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3.4 Behaviour During the War 
Thirty years ago, I denounced the practice of torture by the police and a section of the 
French army in Algeria. If, at that time, I had been told that torture would be used again 
against Algerians and by those who claim to be the heirs of the Revolution, I would not 
have believed it despite my having no illusions about human beings. I was, undoubtedly, 
nai"ve. So we all were. 
Jacques Vergas150 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The military elite's use of terror displayed a remarkable similarity to that deployed by the 
French during the war of liberation. What follows is an exposition of these similarities 
and the continued use of terror and covert activities by the military during the conflict. 
3.4.2 Terror and Covert Activities 
When the French began their campaign of depopulating rural areas during the war of 
liberation, they inadvertently created an urban insurgency. In the slums surrounding 
Algiers these peasants lived in abject poverty and despair which provided a fertile 
breeding ground for insurgency recruitment. The French military however, quickly 
adopted a technique of ascertaining the identities of those inhabiting these slums and 
restricting their individual movement. The military officers first compiled lists detailing 
the inhabitants of each house. Then, during curfew periods these houses were searched 
and individuals who did not belong in the house would be taken into custody. Those that 
were not found were hunted down. Suspects were often detained indefinitely and 
tortured, leading to the unearthing of further terrorist cells. This procedure resulted in the 
death or capture of most insurgents and most of the rebel cells were destroyed. 
150. J. Verges, op. cit. 
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In the case of the current conflict, similar methods were employed. The military 
repeatedly cordoned off neighbourhoods and used hooded informers to search houses and 
arrest suspects. In its attempt to push out the guilty it often sealed off whole districts in 
the capital city for days at a time. Instead of using regular military personnel an anti-
terrorist elite group was set up by the military elite. These men were known as ninjas 
since they wore black masks and black uniforms and were used to patrol and root out 
terrorist cells in most of Algeria's major cities. 1St 
During the fight for independence the French justified the use of torture as a tactical gain. 
Torture was a means of acquiring intelligence information whose usefulness was limited 
in time. In reality, the use of torture had a goal far more important than the stated one. It 
was in fact used to inspire terror within the FLN cadres and the entire Algerian 
population. Torture during the fight for independence brought France to the brink of its 
destruction. It has been suggested that the only way in which France would have 
maintained its dominance over Algeria was if the country's political system had been 
reshaped along totalitarian lines. The military presence in Algeria precluded a 
commitment to human rights values and therefore those in control had significantly more 
leeway in their fight against the insurgents. Amnesty International routinely reported on 
the use of torture on the part of the security forces and victims were held in undisclosed 
locations for weeks. These reports also described the use of extra-judicial executions used 
as an alternative to arresting the suspects or even in retaliation for ambushes. Collective 
punishment such as the destruction of homes and even whole villages in retaliation for 
the killing of soldiers were also common experiences according to these reports. 152 It was 
also reported that many mass killings have occurred in the most militarised regions in the 
country and often in the shadows of army barracks. Yet, no military personnel intervened 
to stop the massacres. In addition, most of these massacres took place in areas with a 
large FIS support base.l53 This has lead to the supposition that the massacres took place 
with the consent, or even on the instruction of certain army and security forces. 
151. W.H. Miller, op. cit., 73. 
152. Ibid. 73-74. 
153. P. Sane, Secretary General-Amnesty International, A 1geria: When the State Fails. News Service 222/97. AI INDEX: MDE 
28/47/97. 1997. 
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Strangely enough within this perpetual violence the state managed to provide adequate 
security during presidential, legislative and local elections in 1995, 1997 and 1999. 
Sufficient and efficient security was also guaranteed at all times in the lucrative oil and 
gas zones. Foreign companies received the best protection possible from the security 
forces. The security forces, on the other hand, failed dismally in their duty to protect the 
civilian population. 154 
Individual cases oftorture have also come to light. Amnesty International publicized 
reports of people who disappeared, compiled from accounts provided by their families. 
Two such individuals were fortunate enough to survive to tell the tale, Brahim Ladada 
and Adbelkrim Khider. Both were taken from their families to the SM base in Ben 
Aknoun on suspicion of being Islamic extremists. They were kept in detention for around 
12 days, the maximum period a detainee may be kept without being charged or before 
seeing a magistrate. The two men were denied access to family, lawyers or doctors. They 
were repeatedly tortured throughout their stay and allegedly remained completely 
undressed throughout this period. They were beaten with batons and plastic pipes and 
tortured using the chiffon method. ISS It is estimated that over 4 000 people detained at the 
SM base in Ben Aknoun, disappeared. SM remains the service most accused of 
committing gross human rights violations. 156 
The FIS repeatedly used the French utilisation of torture in arguing its case against the 
brutality inflicted by the military regime. The FIS argued that although the current regime 
harps on about the need to acquire justice and reparations for war crimes committed 
against Algerians during the war ofliberation, when the opportunity arose they fell silent. 
The FIS viewed this silence as an indication of embarrassment and guilt.157 The recent 
confessions of summary execution and torture by military personnel such as Massu, 
Aussaresses and Bigeard reinforced the idea that the use of institutionalised torture by the 
154. Ibid. 
IS 5. This method will be discussed in detail later. 
156. Amnesty International, Appeal case - Algeria Torture of Brahim Ladada and A bdelkrim Khider, 1411112002, AI INDEX: 
MDE 281020/2002, 2002. 
157. Front Islamique du SaIut, Do notforget the ongoing torture in Algeria, [Online], Available: 
http://www.ccfis.org/dispcol.asp?art=lIO&HiddenPage=1 14k -[16 October 2002J. 
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French military has been adopted again after independence. As mentioned previously, the 
FIS averred that the generals that rule the country were erstwhile French officers who 
infiltrated the ALN at the behest of the French superiors or joined them when they 
realised that the fight for independence would succeed. The Algerians called these people 
'hizb franca', 'party of France' , or harkis. The FIS asserted that many of Algeria's 
current military leaders took part in the practise of torture of Algerians. I 58 
The actions of security forces further resulted in their alienation from the Algerian 
people. Torture had become rife and almost routine after the cancellation of the 1992 
elections. Amnesty International in 1993 reported that the security forces frequently 
resorted to administrative detention without charge. Forms of torture included beatings, 
burning, and near suffocation. The 'chiffon' method was most often used. This involved 
the detainee swallowing large quantities of water until he/she almost suffocates. 159 The 
water torture is reminiscent of torture by the French in the war ofliberation which was 
particularly rife. Aussaresses, captain in the French Special Services attached to the 
French army in Algeria between 1955 and 1957, had this to say about water torture, 
The methods I used were always the same: beatings, electric shocks, and in 
particular water torture, which was the most dangerous technique for the 
prisoner. It never lasted for more than one hour and the suspects would 
speak in the hope of saving their lives. They would therefore either talk 
quickly or never. 160 
Furthermore, after the coup the notion of a fair trial in the special anti-terrorist courts was 
virtually non-existent and recourse to the death penalty used with frightening 
frequency. 161 
158. Ibid. 
159. Amnesty International, Appeal case - Algeria Torture of BraMm Ladada and Abdelkrim Khider, op. cit 
160. M. Ignatieff, The Torture Wars, New Republic, 226 (IS), Database: Academic Search Premier, [18 November 2002],2002, 
226. 
161. M. Stone, op. cit., 197. 
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It should be noted that terrorist activity was also being used to settle blood feuds and 
vendettas which have traditionally played a major role in Algerian society. Many attacks 
often ascribed to terrorist activity by Islamic extremists in fact represented settling of 
scores which originated in times of greater security and stability. An example would be 
the assassination of Kasdi Merbah, former Prime Minister and former Chief of the SM in 
August 1993, which was most probably not the work of Islamic extremists, but more 
likely that of his former enemies within the state apparatus. Reports even indicated that 
former landowners hired militias to raid villages in order to regain land within the chaos 
of the crisis, especially in the Mitidja in the years 1996 and 1997.162 
Finally, although the number of reported cases of torture decreased markedly over the last 
two to three years, Amnesty International continues to receive dozens of accounts of 
people who have been subjected to torture. The majority of the detained individuals were 
arrested on suspicion of having ties with armed Islamist groups or being part of anti-
government protests 163. 
The Algerian military's response to opposition has always been violent and a pattern can 
be seen from its establishment during the war of liberation to the current behaviour of its 
elite. The Algerian military elite appears to have modelled its use of terror on that used 
by the French army, from its means of fmding those who oppose them to its use of 
torture. 
162. Ibid. 178. 
163. Amnesty International, Appeal case - Algeria Torture of BraMm Ladada and Abdelkrim Khider, op. cit 
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3.4.3 Assassinations 
Assassinations appear to be a recurrent theme in Algerian history. The following 
highlights the most dramatic assassination since the coup of 1992. The events of the 
assassination are compiled from an analysis of the proceedings provided by the Free 
Officers. However, the suspicions surrounding Boudiafs assassination are well 
documented and many authors and most Algerians believe there is credence in the 
averment that he was eliminated because of his anti-corruption stance by members of the 
military elite. 164 
Martin Stone quotes the five guiding principles behind Boudiafs anti-corruption 
campaign, which would definitely have sent shivers down the spines of most of the 
Algerian political and military elite. Boudiafhad the following to say, 
First: nobody ... can use me as a means of vengeance or for settling of accounts. 
Second: the dossier of property acquired through suspect methods will be dealt 
with within the framework of the law and by means of justice. Third: the people 
have the right to demand the shedding of light on the management of the state's 
monies and property. It also has the right to look into these issues. We promised 
to open this case and we will honour our promise. Fourth: in the future, all 
precautions will be taken and all necessary means will be adopted to put a final 
end to these practises that corrupt our country and tarnish its reputation. Fifth: I 
agree to the setting up of an investigatory commission to study some cases of 
corruption. It would be appropriate for this commission to be supervised by 
members of the National Consultative Committee. 165 
According to the Free Officers, after the coup the military wanted to present a civilian 
facade to placate the Algerian people and the international community. The generals 
Khaled Nezzar, AbdelMalek Guenaizia, Mohamed Lamari, Mohamed Mediene and 
164. H. Saleb, January 11, Algeria's Decade of Bloody Conflict, BBC News, 2002. 
165. M. Stone, op. cit., 109. 
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Mohamed Touati had to find a president quickly. To further create a sense of legitimacy, 
the person chosen had to be a veteran ofthe war of liberation with a clean past. This they 
found in the person of Boudiaf. 
Boudiaf was a close friend of Kasdi Merbah, the former head of the SM, killed in August 
1993. Boudiaf wanted to reopen the Belloucif case. This was one of the suspected reasons 
behind the assassination. Many Algerians believed that Chadli Benjedid and other 
generals would be implicated in the reopening of the case. The case involved 
misappropriation of funds into the purchase of a radar system which could cover the 
entire Algerian territory. Moustefa Belloucif who was the general secretary of the 
Ministry of Defence at the time, refused to sign off on the project. Belloucif was 
officially discharged by Benjedid for corruption and unprofessional conduct. 
Boudiafworked with the slogan "Algeria before anything else". This meant clearing 
Algeria of all corruption, and this was to be achieved with the aid ofKasdi Merbah and 
Colonel Mourad. One of the most important scandals was the amount of 65 million 
dollars which had disappeared in 12 years. Colonel Mourad was to investigate these 
misappropriations and whether some of the money could be found and given back. 
Boudiaf contacted the then French Premier Minister Pierre Beregovoy to assist in the 
investigation of certain Algerian officials in France. 
A few days later Colonel Mourad and three of his aides went to Paris. A week after his 
return to Algeria, Colonel Mourad was shot dead and the three aides that accompanied 
him were murdered in the two weeks that followed. Upon hearing of the death of Colonel 
Mourad, Boudiaf fled to Morocco in the middle of the night without telling anyone. It 
was the first time in Algerian history that a president abandoned his position. However, 
through persuasion, the president returned, but all files assembled on prominent members 
in the military and certain politicians had been stolen. 
This fervent stance against corruption could not be tolerated and it is believed that a plan 
was developed by Khaled Nezzar, Toufik and Larbi Belkeir to eliminate the president. 
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This would be achieved by infiltrating the presidential security service (SSP) and the 
special intervention group (GIS). The man who would be responsible for the killing was 
second-lieutenant Boumaraafi. At a speech in Annaba surrounded by both the SSP and 
GIS, Boudiaf was assassinated as the Algerian people watched. In a strange turn of 
events, Boumaraafi fled the scene and ran into the nearest house, called the police and 
told them he had just assassinated the president. His reason, he feared that Smain wanted 
him dead and he was probably right. Kamal Aidoun a member of the presidential team 
had failed in his mission in Annaba. Smain Lamari had told him to eliminate Boumaraafi. 
Kamal had fled after the incident. He was caught with his brother and both were 
eliminated. 166 
Once again, the authenticity of most covert accounts coming from Algeria cannot be 
completely verified in an atmosphere riddled with conspiracy. However, the elimination 
of revolutionaries during the war of independence, such as Abane, and Khider and Krim 
under Boumedienne, lend credence to the idea that elimination of unwanted opposition 
was the practise in Algerian political life. Moreover, the emphasis placed by Boudiaf on 
the elimination of corruption does tend to point to those who were benefiting within the 
corrupt system as accomplices to the crime which would place responsibility at the door 
of the elite, whether military or politicaL However, popular academic opinion, 
international media, army officers and humanitarian organisations place responsibility 
with the military elite. 
3.4.4 Conclusion 
The behaviour of the Algerian military, subsequent to the coup, displays similar 
characteristics to that displayed by the French during the Algerian war of liberation. 
Methods adopted to round up suspects, torture and disappearances mirror that of the 
French army. The fact that many of the current generals served in the French army 
reinforces the mirror image of the French army in the eyes of the Algerian people. The 
166. ANP, Surmount We ojJicersfaithfulto the surmount of November the first 1954, op. cit. 
66 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
eradication of those not in agreement with the military elite is a pattern of military 
behaviour since the war of liberation. 
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3.5 Sustaining Military Rule - International Community 
3.5.1 Introduction 
The international community has been pivotal in ensuring that the military remain in 
power in Algeria. Often overt, but sometimes covert, the countries discussed hereunder 
have supported the military state both financially and militarily. It is also evident that 
after the September 11th attacks, the military elite has found new partners in its war 
against terrorism. 
Europe's gas bill 
British journalist John Sweeney's 
description of the over 80 000 deaths in 
Algeria. 167 
Subsequent to the atrocities which followed the 1992 coup, the European government 
released ECU 60 million to the Algerian military government. The agreement was signed 
on December 2, 1996 and the total loan package was worth ECU 125 million and was 
conditional upon conforming to the traditional structural adjustment programmes as 
supervised by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The European Union 
supported a military dictatorship since the FIS proclaimed social reform as its top 
priority.168 In his electoral campaign Abbasi Madani emphasised that Islam was the 
religion of the people, ensured social justice and as a result was capable of producing the 
primary guidelines for ajust political and social order. 169 He accused the West of 
167. J. Sweeney, 1997, 16 November, We Accuse. 80. 000 Times, The Observer. 
168. N. Mosaddeq Ahmed, Algeria and the Paradox a/Democracy, [Online], Available: http://www.amnesty-
volunteer.org/uklalgeria!, [2 January 2003], 200 I. 
169. M. Willis, op. cit,IS7. 
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fostering individual rights and the elite government of maintaining them. As a former 
member of the FLN, he claimed that the party had forsaken its noble principles and had 
become dominated by self-interest. The failures of Algeria were not only as a 
consequence of the ineptitude of the FLN and its bureaucracy, but also as a result ofneo-
colonialism and imperialism which had ensured the domination of the oil market by the 
West and the effective decay of economies of the developing world, such as Algeria 
Abbasi Madani accused the FLN of selling out to the West for short-term economic gain 
at the expense of a sustainable future for Algerians. The FLN had made Algeria 
dependent on an oil market controlled by the West and by selling its most precious 
mineral commodity to the West at a cheap rate. 170 
Such assertions frightened foreign countries with interests in Algeria, and explains their 
support for the military regime. Algeria has the fifth largest oil and gas reserves in the 
world. It is the second largest gas exporter and ranks fourteenth for oil reserves. 
Approximately 90% of Algeria's crude oil exports go to Western Europe, including Italy, 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Britain. Algeria's most important trading 
partners are Italy, France, the United States, Germany and Spain. 
Investment in Algeria flourished since 1991, the dawn of the army's more overt role. In 
December 1991 the Algerian state opened the energy sector to foreign investors. Over 30 
oil and gas companies have been set up in the country since then, these include American 
firms such as Arco, Exxon, Oryx, Anadardko, Mobil and Sun Oil which received 
exploration permits, often in association with European firms such as Agip, BP, and 
Cepsa. 171 
170. lbid.159. 
171. N. Mosaddeq Ahmed. op. cit. 
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3.5.2 French Support 
The French explained their understanding of the crisis as follows: first, the conflict was 
simple, it was one between Islamists and the state; second, the Islamists wanted an 
Islamic state; and third an Islamic republic would be an unmitigated disaster for France 
since it would result in millions of anti-Islamist 'boat people' fleeing their home country 
for the shores of sanctuary in France. This was the view of the conflict the French 
government espoused to the world which made it easier for the military government back 
in Algeria to pursue its policy of extermination. This view was vehemently endorsed in 
1994-1995 especially by the then interior minister, Charles Pasqua.172 
The French, however, went further than espousing a viewpoint supporting the military 
regime. Robert Fisk reported as early as 1994 on the covert military support provided by 
the French. This included helicopters and night sight technology for aerial surveillance of 
guerrilla hideouts. France has acknowledged selling nine Ecureuil helicopters to the 
Algerian government. These helicopters only need to be equipped with rockets and night 
sight equipment in order to serve a military purpose. Although France claimed that the 
helicopters were provided for civilian purposes their provision of the desired rockets and 
night equipment indicate otherwise173• The Islamist opposition to the military regime has 
also routinely accused France- its government or intelligence agencies- of covertly 
assisting its allies within the Algerian military. They drew attention to the fact that the 
GIA's communiques always appeared to be issued in France. 174 
172. M. Stone, op. cit., 242. 
173. R. Fisk, The Hijack: France and the lslamists: Public Enemy No, I (fwd), [Online], Available: 
http://www.inic.utexas.edulmenic/utaustinlcourse/ oilcourse!maillfranee!0005.htmr, [12 August 2002}, 1995. 
174. M. Stone, op. cit., 137. 
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3.5.3 Russian Support 
The erstwhile Soviet Union maintained good diplomatic relations with Algeria ever since 
Algeria gained independence in 1962. However, in the 1980s when the Soviet bloc was 
beginning to falter, foreign relations with its former foe, the United States, improved. 
Nonetheless, Russia remained a military supplier to Algeria. 
In Moscow on May 20, 2002 Major General Mohammed Lamari declared that the 
Algerian military "will cope, neutralise and suppress terrorism in Algeria". This stance 
was encouraged by the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov who responded as 
follows, "We know what damage terrorism does to the economy and especially the 
people of Algeria. We know this from first hand experience because we are fighting this 
evil. This gives us a broad area for cooperation."m 
The Algerian military has much to thank the Russians for. Not only does it have full 
Russian support in its fight against terrorism, but it also has Russian military weapons to 
do it with. On May 28, 200 I, Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov entered into an 
agreement with the Algerian army which seeks to help the Algerian army modernise over 
a ten year period. 176 
3.5.4 United States Support 
Historically, the relationship between the United States and Algeria has been one of 
animosity. Algeria after independence adopted a socialist state which was contrary to the 
values embodied in the American way. The situation was further exacerbated by the 
United States support oflsrael during the 1967 war. At this point the Algerians ceased 
diplomatic relations with the United States. Ideologically and politically the two countries 
differed vastly. Algeria was opposed to United States intervention in Vietnam and other 
deVeloping countries, its support of Israel and its sympathies with Morocco in the 
175. AP Worldstream, 2002, 20 May, Algerian Army Chief Meets with Russian Defence Minister. 
176. ITAR-TASS. 2002, 28 May, Russia to Modernise Algerian Army in Ten-Year Programme. 
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Western Sahara. The United States for its part resented Algerian support of guerrilla and 
radical revolutionary groups. 
Although relations improved in the late 1970s, it was only under Benjedid that tensions 
lessened. Algeria became an important source of petroleum and natural gas for its 
erstwhile enemy. Following the coup, the United States issued a formal, though very low-
key statement that the take-over would not be condoned. However, a mere twenty-four 
hours later this statement was retracted by a Department of State spokesperson. A new 
statement called for a peaceful resolution, but there was no condemnation of the COUp.I77 
Since the declaration of the War on Terror, relations between Algeria and the United 
States have strengthened. The Algerian regime is a fervent supporter of the War on 
Terror since it legitimises the regime's behaviour on an international level. 
3.5.5 Conclusion 
The military coup was not condemned by the superpowers, too much economically was 
at stake if an Islamist government took control. Financial support and military support 
has poured in since the coup which has strengthened the legitimacy of the military coup 
and the military elite's use offorce to combat the Islamist threat. The superpowers have 
once again shown that they will actively support a military controlled state, with 
documented accounts of torture and disappearances, in pursuit of their own interests. 
177. Library of Congress, op. cit. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
The French established the Algerian colony through war, a method only adopted in 
Algeria. Consequently, force as a means to achieve an end and the horrors involved in 
war were issues Algerians were confronted with from an early stage. Political groups 
established to voice the concerns of the Algerians were never unified and bitter rivalries 
were evident. Negotiations, reconciliation, compromise with the French, failed to achieve 
any political benefits for the Algerian people. The armed struggle became the only 
option to unify the cleavages amongst the various groups and to achieve independence. 
Throughout the liberation struggle petty rivalries persisted and those who posed a threat 
to the struggle were eliminated. The French army, for its part, employed torture as a tool 
to root out members of the FLN and to instil fear within the Algerian population. 
At independence Algerian disunity was once again pronounced and only the might of the 
army and the cries of the Algerian people averted a civil war. Ben Bella's brief reign was 
embroiled with disputes, back-handed deals and assassinations. Opposition was not 
tolerated and often dealt with forcibly. The military coup of 1965 led by Boumedienne 
entrenched the power of the army and consolidated the power of a military elite. 
Boumedienne reigned until his death in 1978. He kept a close group of military men by 
his side - known as the Oudja group. Dissent among Algerian society continued to be 
dealt with violently by the military. When Boumedienne became ill, it was the military 
elite who decided that one of its own, Colonel Benjedid, would succeed him. Benjedid 
became president in 1979 and as his predecess6rs had done, dealt forcibly with 
opposition. He similarly kept a close military group by his side at all times. It was this 
military elite, led by Khaled Nezzar, who decided to cancel the second round of elections 
and annul the first in Algeria'S first democratic elections. The coup of 1992 successfully 
prevented the Islamic Salvation Army from taking its democratically earned position in 
government. Thereafter, the military onslaught began. Torture and disappearances 
reminiscent of French military policy was once again practised ensuring that the 
population lived in constant fear. Those who opposed the regime were silenced, usually 
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by the secret services with covert modus operandi. Throughout the conflict money and 
military supplies continued to flow into Algeria from the international community. 
What becomes evident in this historical analysis is that the military has always played a 
dominant role in Algerian political life. Without a historical analysis the violence which 
succeeded the cancellation of the 1992 elections could easily be construed as extreme 
Islamic ideology or a religious - secular battle. History has illustrated that the Algerian 
military has always shown a willingness to use force and often terror, whether covert or 
overt to quell opposition. 
4.1 The Emergence of a Military Elite 
The ALN formed the backbone of the Algerian revolution and the military, in the form of 
the external army, determined the leadership of independent Algeria after the war of 
liberation. Since the coup of 1965, a select group of military men have always remained 
dominant in political affairs. This was clearly seen with Boumedienne's Oudja group, 
Benjedid's inner circle and by the establishment of the HCS. 
During Boumedienne's reign the Oudja group maintained a form of internal cohesion 
necessary in a society deeply divided. Benjedid, his successor, himself a military man, 
knew the importance of the military and maintained a close group of military men in his 
inner circle. When the Islamists were poised for electoral victory, the military acted. The 
coup of 1992 was organised by senior military men who subsequently established a 
governing body which mirrored Boumedienne's Council of Revolution. Although overtly 
the reasons afforded were security and stability, maintenance of power, economic and 
political, were also motivating factors. The onslaught that followed the coup was headed 
by a military elite although once again a civilian facade was maintained. Mass arrests, 
detainment, summary executions and more overt use of military security became regular 
occurrences. 
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Although one cannot speak of a military regime, one active duty colonel I 78 has been 
president since the coup of 1965 until the coup of 1992 and throughout the presidents' 
inner support group has always been military men. The military control of the country 
has remained a permanent fixture of Algerian political life and allegiances, rivalries, and 
responses to opposition evident at the initial stages of Algerian nationalism and 
throughout the revolution continue to plague Algerian politics. Although a facade of 
democracy exists with Algerians going to the polls, real power remains vested in a 
military elite. 
4.2 Violence and the Role of the Algerian Military 
Since the war of independence opposition was dealt with forcibly. The ALN not only 
fought the French but also Algerians who were not part of the cause or belonged to rival 
factions. At independence opposition was once again eliminated by the army, at the cost 
of many more Algerian lives. Ben Bella's reign was similarly riddled with exterminations 
of opposition through assassinations, exiles and executions. Boumedienne effected 
similar purges, and set up the SM which dealt with opposition internally and abroad. 
Benjedid kept the SM to control opposition which became more pronounced during his 
reign especially with the Amazigh people and the Islamists in the early 1980s. It was only 
after the backlash of the 1988 riots when torture was once again used and civilians killed 
that certain bodies within SM were closed because of the bad pUblicity the response to 
the riots had caused. Nonetheless, SM found its vigour once again after the coup. Covert 
military security is often prevalent in military controlled states. Such covert organisations 
were responsible for the disappearances and tortures that consumed Latin American 
states such as Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil in the 1960s and 1970S1 79 and Algeria 
today. 
178. l.W. Harbeson, The Military in African Politics, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1987,21. 
179. A. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988, 14-29. 
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Accordingly, history has illustrated that it has always been the military or Military 
Security which has dealt with opposition, not through discussion, compromise, 
negotiation, but the way the military has been trained to deal with the enemy, through 
force. 
4.3 Terror as a Form of Violence 
Algerian reference to the war of liberation is a recurring theme is current Algerian 
society. The present military leadership is referred to as harkis, those who fought for the 
French in the war of liberation. Groups opposing the regime have researched the 
backgrounds of these men to illustrate their allegiance to the French. Although evidence 
of this is difficult to obtain with regard to all the men, a general grouping of the military 
elite with members of the French army or those who fled the French army when they 
realised the French cause was doomed, prevails among the opposition in Algerian 
society. 
The war of liberation as a legitimating instrument remains sacred in Algerian society. In 
the case of the military elite it has added eminence. The torture practised mirrors that of 
the French and also the methods employed to root out the terrorists reflect those used by 
the French in rooting out the FLN. The horrors of the war of liberation are being 
repeated, however, this time they are being inflicted by Algerians on Algerians. It may be 
that the only way for ordinary Algerians to grasp what is happening is to find the link 
between the men who perpetrate these crimes and the French. Since, although many died 
at the end of the war ofliberation through faction fighting, and although Algerians have 
been killed in protest demonstrations since then, rampant institutionalised torture, 
disappearances and summary executions and are far too reminiscent of French colonial 
military policy. The constant fear Algerians lived through, especially during the Battle of 
Algiers, is currently being relived. It would seem that to delineate Algerians from those 
they hold accountable for the crimes perpetrated, the French connection is sought. 
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The Algerian military has always been a dominant player in the political arena and as a 
result the sword has always been mightier than the pen. The Algerian people have 
endured terror and hardship in a bloody war ofliberation, it is time that those who are 
supposed to protect the Algerian people fulfil their mandate, especially if they purport, as 
they currently do, to be a democracy. A historical pattern of military control and non-
acceptance of opposition marks Algerian elite society. It is time that the Algerian people 
are given the opportunity to learn from history. It is time that the military goes back to the 
barracks, where it belongs. 
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